Can I Sue Someone Over a Defamatory Social Media Post? Social media has transformed the way humans on every continent connect and gather. It allows anyone, anywhere with internet access to share their thoughts instantly. The unfortunate reality of social media is that there will inevitably be defamatory content. For those who are the subject of defamatory social media posts, there is legal recourse: a defamation action. However, before commencing a defamation action against the poster, it’s important to understand what exactly defamation is and how the courts treat it. What is Defamation? The tort of defamation has developed in the courts for centuries, and it is actually an umbrella term for two related torts: libel (the written form) and slander (the spoken form). In 2009, the Supreme Court of Canada (“SCC”) released its decision in Grant v Torstar Corp., one of the most important defamation cases in Canadian history. The SCC explained that there are three elements required for defamation to have occurred: A defamatory statement (i.e., a statement that “would tend to lower the plaintiff’s reputation in the eyes of a reasonable person”); That in fact referred to the plaintiff; and The statement was published (i.e., communicated to a third party).[1] The SCC further explained that defamation is a tort of strict liability. Unlike in the U.S., it is not necessary for the plaintiff to demonstrate intention or even carelessness on the part of the defendant. All that is required for the defendant to be held liable for defamation is that their actions amounted to the above three elements.[2] From the Newspapers to the Digital Domain On October 15, 2024, Justice Corthorn of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice (“ONSC”) released his decision on an application by the Ontario Federation of All Terrain Vehicle Clubs (the “ATV Federation”) pertaining to defamatory social media posts made by a former member of the ATV Federation.[3] In The ATV Federation v Ireland, an individual named Paul Ireland was using a burner account on Facebook to disparage the ATV Federation. Mr. Ireland was previously banned by the ATV Federation from participating in its activities because he was not complying with Ontario’s ATV safety standards, among other things.[4] Mr. Ireland, under the pseudonym “Lone Wolf ATV-er”, shared many posts with his 3,000+ followers in which he described the ATV Federation as being politically and financially corrupt, and accused it of engaging in criminal activities.[5] The ATV Federation reached out to Mr. Ireland’s burner account and asked him to remove the posts and to cease posting these things. Mr. Ireland refused, so the ATV Federation applied to the ONSC for an order than Mr. Ireland take down the posts and that he permanently cease making such posts.[6] After the ATV Federation launched the application, Mr. Ireland did not file a notice of appearance and was thus prohibited from filing materials and giving evidence without leave of the court .[7] Justice Corthorn applied the defamation test from Grant to Mr. Ireland’s posts and determined that: The Facebook posts were defamatory, because “allegations of ethical misconduct, criminality, and corruption, would tend to lower the reputation of the Federation in the eyes of a reasonable person”; The Facebook posts refer to the ATV Federation; and By sharing these posts with thousands of followers, Mr. Ireland did indeed communicate these defamatory statements about the ATV Federation to a third party.[8] Further, Justice Corthorn considered whether Mr. Ireland had raised, despite his lack of evidence, a valid defence.[9] Ultimately, His Honour found that Mr. Ireland had not raised a valid defence.[10] In light of the above, the ATV Federation won on its application and Mr. Ireland was therefore required to remove all his defamatory posts and refrain from posting more defamatory content directed at the ATV Federation. Limitation Period Under the Libel and Slander Act The Libel and Slander Act (the “LSA”) governs defamation actions in Ontario. The LSA provides for a very short limitation period in libel actions which arise out of defamatory statements published in a newspaper or broadcast.[11] The LSA defines newspaper as “a paper containing public news, intelligence, or occurrences, or remarks or observations thereon, or containing only, or principally, advertisements, printed for distribution to the public and published periodically, or in parts or numbers, at least twelve times a year.”[12] Ontario courts recognize the republishing of newspapers online as falling under this definition.[13] The LSA defines broadcasting as “the dissemination of writing, signs, signals, pictures and sounds of all kinds, intended to be received by the public either directly or through the medium of relay stations, by means of, (a) any form of wireless radioelectric communication utilizing Hertzian waves, including radiotelegraph and radiotelephone, or (b) cables, wires, fibre-optic linkages or laser beams”.[14] Section 5(1) of the LSA provides that, where the libel was published in a newspaper or broadcast, the plaintiff must, within six weeks of discovering the libel, serve the defendant with a notice of action. Further, s. 6 provides that a libel action must be commenced within three months of the plaintiff’s discovery of the defamatory content. This is a very tight turnaround for plaintiffs; normally, the limitation period in a civil action is two years.[15] Unfortunately, the Ontario courts have not yet answered the question of whether social media posts fall under the LSA’s definition of broadcast. This is because, so far, almost all cases that have come before the courts have come by way of a motion. Every time one of these motions comes before the court, the motion judge explains that a trial is necessary to make a determination on this issue due to the extensive evidence required by the trial process.[16] Until a court rules on this issue at trial, the applicable limitation period to a defamation action arising from a social media post is up for debate. Conclusion The Grant test for defamation, while originally developed in the context of a newspaper article, has been applied by Ontario courts to find that social media posts can constitute defamation. Despite the lack of clarity from the courts on whether the LSA limitation period applies to social media posts, the law is clear that those who are the subject of defamatory content on social media have legal recourse in civil court. This blog is intended to inform. It is in no way intended to provide legal advice. If you believe you have been defamed on social media, or you have been accused of defaming someone on social media, be sure to seek legal advice from a lawyer. This blog was co-authored by articling student Rachel Weitz. [1] Grant v Torstar Corp., 2009 SCC 61 at para 28 [Grant]. [2] Ibid. [3] See: Ontario Federation of All Terrain Vehicle Clubs v Ireland, 2024 ONSC 5723 [Ireland]. [4] Ibid at para 4. [5] Ibid at para 24. [6] Ibid at paras 6-7. [7] Ibid at para 6; Rules of Civil Procedure, RRO 1990, Reg 194, r. 38.07(2). [8] Ireland, supra note 3 at paras 32-4. [9] Ibid at paras 36-43. [10] Ibid at para 44. [11] Libel and Slander Act, RSO 1990, c L12, s 2 [LSA]. [12] Ibid, s 1(1). [13] See: John v Ballingall et al, 2016 ONSC 2245; See also: Shtaif v Toronto Life Publishing Co. Ltd, 2013 ONCA 405. [14] LSA, supra note 3, s 1(1) [15] Limitations Act, 2002, SO 2002, c 24, Sched B, s 4 – Basic Limitation Period. [16] Devante v Beckerman et al, 2024 ONSC 3425 at paras 23-4; Nanda v McEwan, 2019 ONSC 125 at para 77; By AlyssaBlog, LitigationDecember 2, 2024December 4, 2024
I Bought a Home and I am Beginning to Notice Defects – Am I Liable For the Cost of Repairs? So the saying goes: buying a home is the biggest purchase you will ever make. This is true not just in terms of the price, but also because of our desire to make our homes feel comfortable and safe. That is why it is important to be cautious and diligent when inspecting your potential new abode. Sometimes, though, defects can lay hidden beyond even the most watchful eyes, and creep up months after moving in. These are known as latent defects, and they are actually quite common. Whether you are a purchaser or a vendor, understanding latent defects and how they are treated by the law is crucial in real estate transactions. Defining Latent Defects The universally-accepted definition of latent defects is that they are defects “which an ordinary purchaser would not be expected to unearth in a routine inspection”.[i] In Costa v Wimalasekera, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice (“ONSC”) explained that the due diligence expected of a “prudent solicitor” is not what the courts expect of the ordinary purchaser.[ii] The ordinary purchaser is just that – an average person, without any additional qualifications or special knowledge, looking to buy real property. The notion of the ordinary purchaser is inextricably linked to what constitutes a routine inspection. What would that ordinary purchaser do upon inspection of a home? Activities like opening up the drywall or digging around in the yard are certainly not included. Generally, a routine inspection is an examination of what is “readily observable”.[iii] Any defect that is readily observable upon a routine inspection is known as a patent defect. Liability for Repairing Defects The law is clear that vendors are liable for latent defects of a property. Liability of vendors for latent defects is a well-established notion in Ontario law, dating back to no later than 1979 in the case of McGrath v. MacLean. More recently, the ONSC explained in Vieira v. Dawson that damages for latent defects will arise if the purchaser can establish one of the following: That the vendor was aware of and concealed the defect so as to prevent discovery by the purchaser; or Although he did not deliberately conceal the damage so as to prevent discovery by the purchaser, the defect was known to the vendor and was such that it rendered the property uninhabitable or dangerous or potentially dangerous.[iv] The first scenario is self-evident: if a vendor intends to mask the problem or otherwise prevent its discovery, then they would be liable. The second scenario is somewhat trickier. Number two does not necessitate that the vendor knew something about the property was defective, but it does say that they ought to have known that some part of the property could potentially cause danger. For example: section 8(1) of the Building Code Act requires individuals to obtain a permit in order to construct, demolish, or modify a building. Permits under the Building Code Act ensure compliance with minimum safety standards. So, if a vendor has done such work without a permit and does not inform the purchaser of this fact, the second scenario from Vieira v. Dawson has been satisfied because they have created a potentially dangerous situation. If the purchaser can satisfy the court that the vendor behaved according to one of the above scenarios, then the vendor will be liable to pay damages. In cases of latent defects, the damages are “the cost of repair or replacement of the defect in such a way that the [purchaser] receives what [they] contracted for”.[v] Put another way, if a purchaser bargained for a property to be in good working order, then that purchaser should not be liable for paying out of pocket when they find out the property is not what they bargained for. Importantly, if a vendor was in fact unaware of the defects such that they do not meet either of the above criteria, then they will not be liable to pay for repairs. Conclusion Buying a home really is the most significant transaction the average person will make in their lifetime. That is why it is crucial for vendors to do their part by repairing defects before they become a problem for purchasers, and also by informing purchasers of the property’s history of defects. On the other hand, purchasers should exercise caution when examining a home and should make sure to pose plenty of questions about a property to avoid future disputes. This article was co-authored by articling student Rachel Weitz. This article is intended to inform. Its content does not constitute legal advice and should not be relied upon by readers as such. If you require legal assistance, please see a lawyer. Each case is unique, and a lawyer with good training and sound judgment can provide you with advice tailored to your specific situations [i] Costa v Wimalasekera, 2012 ONSC 6056 (CanLII) at para 21, quoting Real Estate Law (3 ed) by Barry J Reiter et al, p 281. [ii] Ibid at para 22. [iii] Gallagher v Pettinger, 2003 CanLII 21844 (ON SC) at paras 38-40. [iv] Vieira v Dawson, 2018 ONSC 413 (CanLII) at para 19. [v] Ibid at para 32. By AlyssaBlog, Real EstateOctober 28, 2024October 24, 2024
Paw-sitive Changes? A Closer Look at BC’s Pet Ownership Laws In May 2023, DSF published a blog discussing the approach taken by Ontario courts regarding pet ownership disputes and the then-proposed amendments to British Columbia’s Family Law Act. Specifically, the BC government sought to clarify what kinds of decisions its courts can make regarding pets and the processes in arriving at those decisions. A New Approach to Pet Custody As of January 15, 2024, these amendments are now law in BC. Section 97 now includes subsections (4.1) and (4.2), as follows: (4.1) In determining whether to make an order under subsection (1) respecting a companion animal, the Supreme Court must consider the following factors: the circumstances in which the companion animal was acquired; the extent to which each spouse cared for the companion animal; any history of family violence; the risk of family violence; a spouse’s cruelty, or threat of cruelty, toward an animal; the relationship that a child has with the companion animal; the willingness and ability of each spouse to care for the basic needs of the companion animal; any other circumstances the court considers relevant. (4.2) An order respecting a companion animal must not declare that the spouses jointly own the companion animal, or require the spouses to share possession of the companion animal. The factors listed under s. 97(4.1) are based on the factors that courts across the country use to determine what is in the best interests of a child when making an order pertaining to parenting time and decision-making responsibility (i.e., child custody). This approach is very different from Ontario’s “contemporary approach” to determining pet ownership. Despite being called “contemporary”, Ontario’s approach – developed in Coates v Dickson – characterizes pets as property, rather than as a family member over which an individual can have custody. Applying the Amendments: Bayat v Mavedati On March 13, 2024, the Supreme Court of BC (their equivalent of Ontario’s Superior Court) delivered the province’s first judgment pursuant to the new s. 97(4.1). In Bayat v Mavedati, Ms. Bayat sought exclusive care of a golden retriever named Stella following her separation from Mr. Mavedati after three years of cohabitation.[1] The couple had brought Stella home in August 2020.[2] Justice Nielsen found that the parties had evenly split the cost of purchasing Stella, and had also shared the responsibility for her care over the years that they lived together with her.[3] However, many of the facts were in dispute. Ms. Bayat alleged on several occasions that Mr. Mavedati was negligent and even abusive as an owner. Ms. Bayat went so far as to allege that Mr. Mavedati hit Stella after she had an accident in the home.[4] Justice Nielsen disagreed with Ms. Bayat’s evidence, though, in large part due to the fact that Mr. Mavedati is a veterinarian and displayed his love and good intentions toward his dog during his testimony.[5] Ultimately, Justice Nielsen ordered that the parties were to equally share custody of Stella on an interim basis, following a “week-on/week-off” schedule.[6] Further, the parties were to have an equal say in the decision-making process as it relates to Stella’s care.[7] An Illegal Order? While the prospect of joint pet custody is encouraging, recall what subsection 97(4.2) says about this kind of arrangement: (4.2) An order respecting a companion animal must not declare that the spouses jointly own the companion animal, or require the spouses to share possession of the companion animal. Based on the statute’s wording, it appears that Justice Nielsen made an order contrary to subsection 97(4.2). Notably, Justice Nielsen did not reference this subsection in the decision, focusing instead on the factors in subsection 97(4.1). Consequently, joint custody of Stella may not be permissible under the new law. Clarification is needed on whether the Court can indeed grant shared possession of a companion animal and whether this authority is limited to interim orders. What Comes Next? Despite the controversial shared custody order, the decision in Bayat v Mavedati offers hope for the future of Canadian caselaw surrounding pet ownership. As Justice Nielsen remarked: “The recent amendments to the [BC Family Law Act] put the ownership of a companion animal…in the context of something that goes beyond ownership of [goods].”[8] These amendments recognize that companion animals are not objects; rather, they are sentient beings capable of experiencing love. This article was co-authored by articling student Rachel Weitz. “This article is intended to inform. Its content does not constitute legal advice and should not be relied upon by readers as such. If you require legal assistance, please see a lawyer. Each case is unique, and a lawyer with good training and sound judgment can provide you with advice tailored to your specific situations and needs.” [1] Bayat v Mavedati, 2024 BCSC 619 at paras 1-2 [Bayat]. [2] Ibid at para 4. [3] Ibid at paras 4, 7, 15. [4] Ibid at para 12. [5] Ibid at paras 8-12. [6] Ibid at para 15. [7] Ibid at para 18. [8] Ibid at para 14. By AlyssaBlog, Family LawOctober 14, 2024October 24, 2024
Can the Bank Increase the Interest Rate On My Mortgage After I Default? Defaulting on a mortgage is an extremely stressful event for any property owner. Many consequences can arise in the event of a default. Fortunately for the defaulting party, an interest rate hike on the money owing is not one of them. Keep reading to learn about the prohibition against mortgagees from charging punitive fees after a mortgagor has defaulted. Terminology Before reading on, here’s an explanation of the terms used frequently in this blog: Arrears – the state of having a debt that is overdue. Mortgagor – the party that has obtained a mortgage. Mortgagee – the party that has granted the mortgage. Default – non-compliance with the terms of the mortgage agreement; normally, this occurs when the mortgagor fails to pay out the balance of the mortgage at maturity (i.e., when the mortgagor is in arrears). Section 8 of the Interest Act The Interest Act is a piece of federal legislation that governs the levying of interest on loans. According to s. 2 of the Interest Act, “any person may stipulate for, allow and exact, on any contract or agreement whatever, any rate of interest or discount that is agreed on.”[1] Note that corporations have the status of legal personhood, so s. 2 applies equally to all individuals and corporations, including banks. Section 8 sets out the prohibition against punitive fees, and provides that: No fine, etc., allowed on payments in arrears 8 (1) No fine, penalty or rate of interest shall be stipulated for, taken, reserved or exacted on any arrears of principal or interest secured by mortgage on real property or hypothec on immovables that has the effect of increasing the charge on the arrears beyond the rate of interest payable on principal money not in arrears. Interest on arrears (2) Nothing in this section has the effect of prohibiting a contract for the payment of interest on arrears of interest or principal at any rate not greater than the rate payable on principal money not in arrears. In simpler terms, s. 8(1) prevents the mortgagee from raising the interest rate on money that is in arrears. Subsection 8(2) explains that interest can be charged on money in arrears, but it must be at most the same rate that was charged on the principal amount of the mortgage. Let’s look at a case to illustrate how s. 8 operates. Krayzel Corporation v Equitable Trust Co., 2016 SCC 18 Facts A corporation called Lougheed Block Inc. (“Lougheed”) owned an office building in Calgary with multiple mortgages on it, including the one held by the appellant, Krayzel Corporation. In 2006, Lougheed obtained a mortgage from Equitable Trust Co., which is now known as Equitable Bank (“Equitable”). The terms of the mortgage were as follows: Maturity date: June 30, 2008; Amount of loan: $27 million; Interest rate: prime plus 2.875 per annum.[2] At the time of the mortgage transaction, the prime rate was 6% and at maturity, it was 4.75%, so the rate fluctuated between 8.875% and 7.625% over the course of the mortgage.[3] The maturity date arrived, and Lougheed defaulted on the mortgage. Equitable did something very commonly employed by mortgagees: it extended the mortgage for a short period of time under what they called a Renewal Agreement.[4] The Renewal Agreement was effective as of August 1, 2008, for a period of 7 months and carried an interest rate of prime plus 3.125 for the first 6 months, and then 25% for the 7th month. Again, the agreement matured and Lougheed couldn’t pay. So, the parties entered into a second Renewal Agreement. The terms of the second agreement were quite complex, so the Supreme Court of Canada (“SCC”) broke them down as follows: The 2nd agreement was effective as of February 1, 2009 – meaning it was retroactive to before the 1st agreement matured; The yearly interest rate would be 25%; Lougheed was to make monthly interest payments at a “pay rate” of either 7.5% or prime plus 5.25%, whichever was greater; Interest would accrue to the mortgage at a rate of the difference between the amount payable at 25% and the amount payable by Lougheed at the rate in #3; and “[Were] Lougheed to make all payments in full and on time and to pay out the loan when due, it would be excused from paying the amount representing the difference between interest payable at 25 percent and interest actually paid in accordance with the lower rate.”[5] Unfortunately, they defaulted on the first payment, so Equitable demanded repayment at 25% interest.[6] Issues Was s. 8 of the Interest Act violated by the imposition of an interest rate effective only where the mortgagor defaulted?[7] Judgment: YES Is s. 8 violated where the mortgagee raises interest rates solely because of “the mere passage of time”?[8] Judgment: NO Reasoning The Purpose and Scope of Section 8 The Supreme Court of Canada (“SCC”) first looked into the true purpose of s. 8 of the Interest Act. Brown J., writing for the majority, agreed that the holding of the BC Court of Appeal in Reliant Capital Ltd. v Silverdale Development Corp. that this clause exists “to protect the owners of real estate from interest or other charges that would make it impossible for owners to redeem, or to protect their equity.”[9] Brown J. then turned to the wording of s. 8 and noted that it is directed at “the effect of the [particular] mortgage term” and not merely the explicit term itself. Section 8 is concerned with the consequences flowing from the operation of the term. Brown J. therefore concluded that if the term’s effect “is to impose a higher rate on arrears than on money not in arrears, then s. 8 is offended”.[10] Even if the term is presented by the mortgagee as a discount, if the discount is effectively punitive to the mortgagor, then that term violates s. 8 of the Interest Act.[11] The First Renewal Agreement Recall that the first renewal agreement implemented the higher rate of 25% only after 6 months had passed, and was to occur regardless of Lougheed’s level of compliance therewith. Brown J. held that this increase was “triggered by the mere passage of time” rather than purely because Lougheed defaulted. In light of this, there was no violation of s. 8 under the terms of the first renewal agreement.[12] The Second Renewal Agreement The second renewal agreement was where the rate increase lost its legitimacy. Recall that under term #5, if Lougheed made good on all its mortgage payments, it would pay the lower rate, or what Equitable labelled as the “pay rate”. However, once Lougheed defaulted, Equitable drastically increased the interest rate and demanded repayment carrying a 25% interest rate. Brown J. held that the second renewal agreement had the effect of placing a higher charge on arrears than what Equitable was charging on the principal money owed.[13] The “pay rate” was actually a discounted rate, and once Lougheed was in arrears, the rate rose to 25%, the real rate. Brown J. thus concluded that to label “one charge as an ‘interest rate’ and the other as a ‘pay rate’ is of no consequence,” because the effect was to punish Lougheed for defaulting.[14] Conclusion There are myriad reasons – legal and financial – to make your mortgage payments in full and on time. However, mortgagees cannot fiddle with the interest rates as a way to incentivise or punish you for paying or defaulting. Whether you’re a lender or a borrower, it’s essential to have legal advice to assist you with drafting, negotiating, interpreting, and enforcing (or contesting!) your mortgage loan terms. Contact a DSF lawyer today for assistance. This blog was co-authored by articling student Rachel Weitz. Disclaimer: This blog is for educational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. If you are in need of assistance, please contact a lawyer. Each case is unique, and a lawyer with the proper training and sound judgment can provide you with advice tailored to your specific situation and needs. [1] Interest Act, RSC 1985, c I-15, s 2 [Interest Act]. [2] Krayzel Corporation v Equitable Trust Co., 2016 SCC 18 at para 4 [Equitable]. [3] Bank of Canada, “Interest rates posted for selected products by the major chartered banks,” 2005-2010, retrieved on September 20, 2024, <https://www.bankofcanada.ca/rates/banking-and-financial-statistics/posted-interest-rates-offered-by-chartered-banks/>. [4] Equitable, supra note 2 at para 5. [5] Ibid at para 6. [6] Ibid at para 7. [7] Ibid at para 1. [8] Ibid at para 2. [9] Ibid at para 21. [10] Ibid at para 25. [11] Ibid at para 31. [12] Ibid at para 33. [13] Ibid at para 35. [14] Ibid. By AlyssaBlog, Collections and Mortgage RecoveryOctober 7, 2024October 3, 2024
What’s In a Name? The Evolution of a “Child” Under the Succession Law Reform Act Proper estate planning requires effectively communicating the intentions of the deceased. In doing so, even simple words can create significant interpretation issues in the administration of an estate and lead to long and costly court battles. One very common issue faced in Estates Law is the definition of a “child” in a will or under the Succession Law Reform Act (SLRA).[1] While general definitions are outlined in most will templates to provide guidance for executors and solicitors, a definition as simple as “child” or “issue” has caused significant confusion over the years. Children Conceived and Born After Parent’s Death The SLRA was amended in 2017 to expand the definition of a child to include a child that was conceived and born after a parent’s death: 1(1) In this Act, “child” includes, (a) a child conceived before and born alive after the parent’s death, and (b) a child conceived and born alive after the parent’s death, if the conditions in subsection 1.1 (1) are met; Section 1.1(1) outlines the conditions that must be met for a child conceived and born alive after a person’s death to be considered a “child” under the Act: 1.1 (1) The following conditions respecting a child conceived and born alive after a person’s death apply for the purposes of this Act: The person who, at the time of the death of the deceased person, was his or her spouse, must give written notice to the Estate Registrar for Ontario that the person may use reproductive material or an embryo to attempt to conceive, through assisted reproduction and with or without a surrogate, a child in relation to which the deceased person intended to be a parent. The notice under paragraph 1 must be in the form provided by the Ministry of the Attorney General and given no later than six months after the deceased person’s death. The posthumously-conceived child must be born no later than the third anniversary of the deceased person’s death, or such later time as may be specified by the Superior Court of Justice under subsection (3). A court has made a declaration under section 12 of the Children’s Law Reform Act establishing the deceased person’s parentage of the posthumously-conceived child. In essence: The child’s parent must have been the married spouse of the deceased, as the SLRA does not recognize common law spouses; The spouse must give notice of their intention to use the reproductive material of the deceased to the Estate Registrar for Ontario no later than six months after the deceased’s death; The child must be born within three years of the deceased’s death, unless the court orders otherwise; and The spouse must obtain a declaration from the court under Section 12 of the Children’s Law Reform Act (CLRA) that the deceased is a parent of the child. Special Relationship In Ksianzyna Estate v. Pastuszok [2], Justice Brown was tasked with analyzing whether the court should expand the definition of “child” in subsection 1(1) of the SLRA to minors who enjoy a “special relationship” with a testator. While Part V of the SLRA, which governs dependant support claims, expands the definition of “child” to include those who the deceased “has demonstrated a settled intention to treat as a child of his or her family,”[3] this broader definition does not apply to the rest of the Act. Justice Brown declined to expand the general definition of “child” under the SLRA, as “the power to expand the scope of familial terms or social concepts beyond their plain and ordinary meaning is one that rests with the legislatures, not with the courts.”[4] As such, someone who enjoyed a “special relationship” with a testator or deceased will not be considered a “child” under the SLRA for testate or intestate succession but may be considered a child for the purposes of dependant support. Foster Children The Ontario Superior Court of Justice recently re-examined the definition of a child under the SLRA in Estate of Sydney Monteith v Monteith et al.[5] In this case, the applicant was a foster child seeking to receive a share of her foster father’s estate under the rules of intestate succession after he died without a will. However, the court affirmed the decision in Ksianzyna and found that: …the harsh, but inescapable, reality is that she does not qualify because she is a foster child who has never been adopted. This is a matter of statute, the plain language of which I find to be very clear, and which is binding and determinative. I am not disposed to ignore the statutory provisions discussed above in the guise of “doing justice”.[6] Accordingly, like children who enjoy a “special relationship” with the testator, a foster child is not considered a “child” for the purposes of testate or intestate succession under the SLRA but may be able to make a dependant support claim if they fall within the expanded definition of “child” under Part V of the Act. “Settled Intention” of the Deceased As noted above, while the definition of a child is strictly interpreted under subsection 1(1) of the SLRA, there is a broader definition of “child” under Part V of the Act which addresses the support of dependants. An application for support under Part V of the Act is distinct from a claim of inheritance under a Will or on intestacy. Under subsection 57(1) a “child” includes “a person whom the deceased has demonstrated a settled intention to treat as a child of his or her family.” In that same section, a “dependant” is defined as the spouse, parent, child, or sibling of the deceased “to whom the deceased was providing support or was under a legal obligation to provide support immediately before his or her death.”[7] As such, if the deceased was providing support to a person who was not their biological or adopted child, but to whom they had demonstrated an intention to treat as their child, then that person could make a dependant support claim against their estate. The term “settled intention” has been the topic of much debate in the courts. In Pigott Estate v Pigott, the court held that at least one of the following factors must be present to establish a settled intention between the deceased and the applicant: Cohabitation with the child; Treatment of the child on equal footing with their own child(ren); Decision-making power with respect to the child’s name, schooling, discipline, and so on; Continued access or visitation with the child; or Financial contributions to the daily needs of the child. [8] While one of these factors must be present for the courts to find that the deceased had a “settled intention” to treat a person as their child, the existence of one of these factors will not be determinative in showing that a settled intention exists. For instance, in Stajduhar v Wolfe, Justice Dunphy concluded that the deceased had no settled intention to treat his girlfriend’s daughter as his child, even though he provided her with financial support while at university.[9] In reaching this conclusion, Justice Dunphy also considered that the deceased never introduced the applicant to any of his family, including his two children; never characterized applicant as his daughter to his friends or family; did not provide for the applicant in his will, even though he specifically provided for his own two children; and that none of the deceased’s writings indicated that he intended to treat the applicant as his child.[10] Impact on Estate Planning Under the general definitions section of the SLRA, a “child” is limited to biological or adopted children of the deceased. Foster children, stepchildren, and others who the deceased intended to treat as their child do not fall within this definition; as such, they have limited recourse in the courts, unless they are applying for dependant support. If you are planning your estate, it is important to be aware of these definitions and consider their implications. If your child is not your adopted or biological child but you still want them to benefit from your estate, then you must plan your estate accordingly, given that they will have no rights on if you pass away without a Will. Moreover, it is important to ensure that the definition of “child” in your Will is broad enough to include anyone that you consider to be your child, or that you specifically refer to your child by name in your bequests. If you would like more information regarding estate planning, please contact experienced Wills and Estates Lawyer, Jillian Bowman, of Devry Smith Frank LLP at (249) 888-4639 or at jillian.bowman@devrylaw.ca This article is intended to inform. Its content does not constitute legal advice and should not be relied upon by readers as such. If you require legal assistance, please see a lawyer. Each case is unique and a lawyer with good training and sound judgment can provide you with advice tailored to your specific situation and needs. This blog was co-authored by Summer Law Student, Jason Corry, and Articling Student, Leslie Haddock. [1] RSO c S 26 [SLRA]. [2] 2008 CanLII 59321 (ON SC) [Ksianzyna]. [3] SLRA, supra note 1, s 57(1). [4] Ksianzyna, supra note 3 at para 12. [5] 2023 ONSC 7246 [Monteith]. [6] Ibid at para 24. [7] SLRA, supra note 1, s 57(1). [8] Pigott Estate v Pigott, 1998 CarswellOnt 2875 at para 14. [9] Stajduhar v Wolfe, 2017 ONSC 4954 at para 154, aff’d Kerzner Estate, 2018 ONCA 258, refused leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada [Stajduhar]. [10] Ibid at para 153. By AlyssaBlog, Family LawSeptember 23, 2024October 10, 2024
The Importance of Substantive Evidence When Challenging the Validity of a Will In a recent Ontario Superior Court of Justice decision, Graham v. McNally Estate and Blais,[1] Justice Corthorn considers whether an evidentiary burden threshold has been met to successfully challenge the validity of an executed will. Facts Sheila Mary McNally (“Sheila”), passed away in October 2021. In her will, Sheila named her friend of 14 years, Katherine Blais (“Katherine”), the respondent in this action, as the primary estate trustee, attorney for property, attorney for personal care, and beneficiary along with Katherine’s spouse. Patricia Graham (“Patricia”), sister of the late Sheila, and the applicant in this proceeding, challenged the validity of the will. To support her claim, Patricia relied on three main arguments; Sheila’s lack of testamentary capacity, the presence of undue influence, and suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of the will. In response, Katherine brought a motion for an order to dismiss the application claiming that Patricia had not met the evidentiary burden threshold that is required for the court to allow the proceeding to continue. Lack of Testamentary Capacity In November 2020 Sheila decided to update her will that was previously prepared in 2001. Patricia alleged that Sheila’s updated will was invalid because she lacked testamentary capacity due to mental illness, difficulty calculating numbers, and confusion.[2] The court found that the evidence Patricia relied upon is nothing more than mere speculation and is not substantiated by any objective evidence, such as medical records.[3] Therefore, the evidence did not meet the applicable threshold to support Patricia’s claim that Sheila lacked testamentary capacity when she executed her will. Undue Influence and Suspicious Circumstances Patricia also claimed that Katherine unduly influenced Sheila and pointed to suspicious circumstances surrounding the will’s execution. In order for a claim of undue influence to be successful, there must be coercion and the influence imposed on the testator must be “so overpowering that the document reflects the will of the influencer and not that of the deceased”.[4] The Superior Court of Justice concluded that Patricia was unsuccessful in meeting this threshold because she was unable to adduce and point to any evidence illustrating Katherine attempted to influence Sheila in any way with regard to the execution of her 2020 will.[5] Patrica also asked the court to find the will invalid based on suspicious circumstances at the time of the execution of the will. However, Patricia was also unable to provide any evidence that would rebut the presumption that Sheila had knowledge of and approved the contents of the will. Sheila executed the will with legal assistance and there were no irregularities or any indication of suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution.[6] Decision The court concluded that Patricia did not meet the minimal evidentiary threshold required to challenge the will. The court deemed suspicions alone are insufficient to invalidate the will, and her objections were based on speculation rather than substantive evidence.[7] Therefore the court decided to grant the motion and dismiss the application in its entirety.[8] Takeaway Justice Corthorn’s decision and reasoning in Graham v. McNally Estate and Blais demonstrates the importance of providing a true evidentiary basis that is based on substantive, anecdotal proof, as opposed to mere speculation and opinion when attempting to contest the validity of a will. If you have questions about challenging a will, please contact Esther Abecassis, wills and estates lawyer at Devry Smith Frank LLP at 416-446-3310 or esther.abecassis@devrylaw.ca. “This article is intended to inform. Its content does not constitute legal advice and should not be relied upon by readers as such. If you require legal assistance, please see a lawyer. Each case is unique, and a lawyer with good training and sound judgment can provide you with advice tailored to your specific situations and needs.” This blog was co-written by summer law student Adriana Piccolo. [1] 2024 ONSC 4006 (CanLII). [2] Ibid at para 49. [3] Ibid at para 58. [4] Young v. Prychitko et al, 2022 ONSC 1502 (CanLII) at paras 20-21. [5] Supra note 1 at para 75. [6] Ibid at para 14. [7] Ibid at para 32. [8] Ibid at para 96. By AlyssaBlog, Wills and EstatesSeptember 16, 2024September 26, 2024
What Will the Working for Workers Five Act Mean for Employers? On May 6, 2024, the Ontario Government introduced Bill 190: Working for Workers Five Act, 2024.[1] The proposed Bill seeks to provide greater protection for employees by amending the Employment Standards Act, 2000 (ESA) and the Occupational Health and Safety Act (OHSA). Most notably, the proposed amendments seek to increase the fines that individuals might face if convicted of an offence under the ESA. This blog addresses the potential impact of the proposed legislative changes on employers. The Current Statutory Scheme Under the OHSA OHSA establishes minimum health and safety standards and practices that all parties in the workplace must follow. The Minister of Labour is responsible for the administration of the Act and appointing inspectors who assess an employer’s compliance with the OHSA.[2] Pursuant to section 66 of OHSA, any person who contravenes or fails to comply with the Act “is guilty of an offence and on conviction is liable to a fine of not more than $500,000 or to imprisonment for a term of not more than twelve months, or to both.”[3] A corporation convicted of an offence is liable to a fine of up to $2 million.[4] Under the ESA The ESA governs the relationship between most employees and employers in Ontario. The ESA sets out minimum entitlements of employees. It is not permissible for an employee and employee to contract out of the ESA. As with the OHSA, the Ministry of Labour is responsible for the administration of the Act. The Minister can appoint employment standards officers, who have broad powers to investigate possible contraventions of the Act and perform inspections to ensure that the Act is being complied with.[5] Following an investigation, employers may be convicted of contravening the ESA. thereby leaving them vulnerable to fines and even imprisonment. Section 132 of the ESA imposes penalties on any person, including a corporation or a trade union, who violates a provision of the Act, such as failing to provide overtime pay or refusing to reinstate an employee after a protected leave. Pursuant to this section: If the person is an individual, they may be liable to a fine of not more than $50,000 or to imprisonment of not more than twelve months, or both; If the person is a corporation, it may be liable to a fine of not more than $100,000; If the person is a corporation that has previously been convicted of an offence under this Act: if the person has one previous conviction, to a fine of not more than $250,000; or If the person has more than one previous conviction, to a fine of not more than $500,000.[6] Proposed Amendments The proposed amendments to the OHSA include: Constructors and employers have new duties regarding the maintenance of washroom facilities in the workplace, including ensuring that they remain clean and sanitary and keeping records of such cleaning; The definitions of “workplace harassment” and “workplace sexual harassment” are expanded to include acts of virtual harassment enacted through the use of information and communications technology; The application of the Act is expanded to include telework performed in or about a private residence; and Information can be “posted”, pursuant to requirements under the Act by making them available in an electronic format if (a) employers provide workers with instructions on how to access the information and (b) if the information can be readily accessed by workers in the workplace. Takeaways for Employers: These proposed amendments largely address the new reality of virtual work environments. An employer’s duty to ensure a safe work environment does not change when the workplace is largely virtual. Employers can also use virtual spaces to fulfill some of their obligations under the OHSA. The proposed amendments to the ESA include: New obligations are imposed on employers who publicly advertise job postings, including disclosing whether the posting is for a currently vacant position and other information to be prescribed, within a set time frame of the applicant’s interview; Employers may require evidence reasonable in the circumstances that an employee is entitled to sick leave, but cannot require a certificate from a qualified health practitioner; The maximum fine that could be imposed on a person for contravening the Act is increased from $50,000 to $100,000. Similarly, ESA Reg. 289/01 is to be amended to increase the fine for offenders of a third or subsequent contravention affecting multiple employees in a three-year period from $1,000 to $5,000, multiplied by the number of affected employees. Takeaways for Employers: The proposed amendments represent a strong deterrent for potential non-compliant employers. Employers who have been sanctioned for non-compliance in the past should be especially careful to avoid repeat offences, given the heightened cost consequences associated with them. Employers should also be aware of their disclosure obligations if they use publicly advertised job postings and keep up to date with the information which must be provided. Employers may also be required to alter their policies on sick leave, given that employers are no longer permitted to require employees to produce sick notes. It is yet to be seen what will constitute “evidence reasonable in the circumstances” in the absence of documentation from a medical professional. If you would like more information about these amendments or would like legal advice to ensure your place of work follows these new requirements, please contact experienced employment lawyer, Marty Rabinovitch, of Devry Smith Frank LLP at 416-446-5826 or marty.rabinovitch@devrylaw.ca. This article is intended to inform. Its content does not constitute legal advice and should not be relied upon by readers as such. If you require legal assistance, please see a lawyer. Each case is unique and a lawyer with good training and sound judgment can provide you with advice tailored to your specific situation and needs This blog was co-authored by Summer Law Student, Jason Corry and Articling Student, Leslie Haddock. [1] Hon. David Piccini, “Bill 190, Working for Workers Five Act, 2024,” Legislative Assembly of Ontario, online: www.ola.org/en/legislative-business/bills/parliament-43/session-1/bill-190. [2] Occupational Health and Safety Act, RSO 1990, c O.1, s 6(1) [OHSA]. [3] Ibid, s 66(1). [4] Ibid, s 66(2). [5] Employment Standards Act, 2000, SO 2000, c 41, s 91 [ESA]. [6] Ibid, s 132. By AlyssaBlog, Employment LawSeptember 9, 2024September 26, 2024
Foreclosure vs. Power of Sale – What are the Differences? One of the unfortunate circumstances of defaulting on mortgage obligations is the possibility of foreclosure or power of sale. These terms are often, but incorrectly, used interchangeably. Both foreclosure and power of sale result in repossession and sale of the home, but the manner in which the repossession occurs differs depending on which process is used. Power of Sale A power of sale is the most common forced sale process. A power of sale occurs when the mortgagee (the lender), obtains the legal right to evict the occupants of a property due to a default in their mortgage payment. The mortgagee then sells the property to recover any funds owing. The power of sale process begins with the issuance of a Notice of Sale by the mortgagee. Once that is granted, there is a 35-day redemption period in which the mortgagor (the borrower), can bring mortgage arrears current. If the mortgagor is unable to pay the arrears, the mortgagee will receive an issuance of judgment by the court. At that point, the mortgagee can obtain a Writ of Possession and proceed to sell the home. Foreclosure In a foreclosure, the mortgagee takes the legal title to the property. In other words, the mortgagee has complete ownership and control over the property and can sell the property as they see fit. Foreclosures may be preferable to lenders when the real estate market is down, and the value of the property is not currently high enough to repay the mortgage debt. To commence an action for foreclosure, the mortgagee files a Notice of Intention to Redeem. Upon receiving a final order of foreclosure, the mortgagee is free to deal with the property however they want. This process is lengthier and typically does not begin until several months of missed payments. A court of equity is willing to hear a meritorious application for relief and set aside a final order of foreclosure. Banbury v Tahir outlined five requirements that must be satisfied: reasonable promptness on the part of the applicant; reasonable prospect of payment at once or in a short period of time; activity on the part of the applicant to raise the money necessary to redeem on time; the applicant must have a substantial interest in the property; and where the property has been sold after foreclosure, the rights of the purchase will not be unduly prejudiced. Below is a list of key differences between the two terms. FORECLOSURE POWER OF SALE Mortgagee obtains legal title or ownership Mortgagee obtains a right to sell Typically occurs 4 months after missed payments Typically occurs as soon as 15 days after missed payments Redemption period is typically 60 days Redemption period is 35 days Mortgagee has no obligation when selling property Mortgagee must sell at fair market value Equity or profit from the sale kept by the mortgagee Equity or profit from the sale is paid to the mortgagor Mortgagee loses the right to sue for any shortfall Mortgagee can sue for any shortfall This blog was co-authored by summer law student, Barbara Attia. “This article is intended to inform. Its content does not constitute legal advice and should not be relied upon by readers as such. If you require legal assistance, please see a lawyer. Each case is unique, and a lawyer with good training and sound judgment can provide you with advice tailored to your specific situations and needs.” By Fauzan SiddiquiBlog, Collections and Mortgage RecoverySeptember 2, 2024September 4, 2024
Family Violence New Tort Rejected by ONCA appealed to SCC In a 2022 Ontario Superior Court of Justice decision Ahluwalia v. Ahluwalia,[1] Justice Mandhane created a new tort of family violence. Facts The parties married in November 1999 and separated in July 2016. This marriage was anything but typical. Rather, it was characterized by abuse and sixteen years of coercion and control from the father. During the course of their marriage the parties had two children together. However, since separation, the children refused to see their father aside from a few visits. Trial Decision Justice Mandhane awarded the mother damages in the amount of $150,000 for compensatory, aggregated, and punitive damages as a result of emotional, physical and financial control. The trial judge also recognized a new tort of family violence. Justice Mandhane believes that this new tort would effectively address the reality of prolonged family violence which is not captured from existing torts. Further, this new tort remedy would provide survivors of domestic abuse an avenue to pursue accountability and provide financial independence by attending a single proceeding rather than multiple, which is often required with other tort actions. This could potentially make it more realistic for women to leave violent relationships. [2] Justice Mandhane set out a three part test to establish the defendant’s liability where their conduct is: is violent or threatening, or constitutes a pattern of coercive and controlling behaviour, or causes the plaintiff to fear for their own safety or that of another person.[3] The trial judge acknowledges that these three steps overlap with existing torts, however, notes that the existing torts “do not fully capture the cumulative harm associated with the pattern of coercion and control that lays at the heart of family violence cases”.[4] The tort of family violence would allow consideration of, and compensation for, the pattern of violence,[5] not just the individual incidents as seen with alternate tort actions. Ontario Court of Appeal Shortly after, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice’s decision was appealed to the Ontario Court of Appeal.[6] Here, Justice Benotto rejected the creation of the new tort of family violence on multiple grounds. First, Justice Benotto notes that common law change is slow and incremental rather than quick and dramatic.[7] Thus, suggesting that this change would be significant and best left to the legislature as opposed to the court system. Second, Justice Benotto suggests that existing tort remedies effectively address family violence and the creation of a new tort is therefore unnecessary. In the present case, Justice Benotto notes that the father’s abusive conduct satisfies the requirements for the tort of battery, assault, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.[8] Justice Benotto states that these tort actions adequately address the potential issues that would arise under the novel tort remedy. National Importance The Court of Appeal’s decision has now been appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada. This decision has yet to be heard. The rejection of the tort of family violence from the Ontario Court of Appeal can be disappointing to survivors of family violence, but a positive decision may come about from the Supreme Court of Canada. Multiple not for profit foundations such as Barbra Schlifer Commemorative Clinic and Luke’s Place have intervened to provide a more nuanced and intersectional perspective to the court about the prevalence and nature of family violence and the experience of survivors of patterns of abuse. These foundations argue that the tort of family violence is an important and necessary step for the evolution of common law. They note that existing torts do not properly capture and compensate the true nature of family violence that is a pattern of coercive and controlling behaviour. Statistics Canada further exemplifies the magnitude of domestic violence in Canada and illustrate the need for the new tort of family violence. In 2022 alone, there were 129,876 victims of police-reported family violence and 117,093 victims of intimate partner violence. Domestic Abuse Services Oxford demonstrates that family violence can lead to extreme circumstances, such as homicides. They note that spousal homicides account for 15% of all homicides in Canada. Women are at greatest risk and are nine times more likely to be murdered by an intimate partner than by a stranger. Given the magnitude of the issue at hand, it is hoped that the Supreme Court of Canada decision will provide clarity on this legal issue, and also adequately compensate and support victims of family violence. This blog was co-authored by Summer Law Student, Adriana Piccolo “This article is intended to inform. Its content does not constitute legal advice and should not be relied upon by readers as such. If you require legal assistance, please see a lawyer. Each case is unique, and a lawyer with good training and sound judgment can provide you with advice tailored to your specific situations and needs.” [1] 2022 ONSC 1303 [Ahluwalia]. [2] Ahluwalia v. Ahluwalia, 2023 ONCA 476. [3] Ahluwalia, supra note 1 at para 52. [4] Ibid at para 54. [5] Ibid at para 23. [6] Ahluwalia, supra note 2. [7] Ibid at para 50. [8] Ibid at para 52. By Fauzan SiddiquiBlog, Family LawAugust 26, 2024August 14, 2024
Can I Get a Divorce In Canada If I Was Married In India? In Canada, individuals married in India can apply for a divorce if one spouse has resided in a Canadian province for over a year. This process is recognized by both Canada and India, though the legalities and implications differ significantly between the two countries. Understanding these differences is crucial for couples going through the process of international divorce. Legal Jurisdiction and Criteria for Filing for Divorce in Canada The Divorce Act governs divorce proceedings across Canada, although provincial regulations may also apply. To initiate a divorce, one spouse must reside in the province where the application is filed. Couples must meet certain conditions to file for divorce in Canada. The most common ground is a one-year separation, during which the couple has lived apart (whether in the same home or separately) and ceased acting as a married couple. Exceptions to the one-year separation include cases of adultery or cruelty, which require substantial proof. There are three types of divorces in Canada: joint, uncontested, and contested, each with its own procedural nuances. Consulting a family lawyer is advisable to navigate the specific legal requirements and ensure a smooth process. Impact of International Marriages on Divorce Proceedings Indian couples in Canada face unique challenges when seeking a divorce due to differences in legal frameworks. In India, divorces can be either mutual or contested. A mutual divorce involves a six-month waiting period, while contested divorces require prolonged court proceedings. In Canada, joint divorces allow couples to file a notice of family claim together, potentially avoiding court if uncontested. Contested divorces, however, can be lengthy and complex, necessitating court involvement. For a marriage from India to be recognized in Canada, it must comply with Canadian legal standards. This often involves validating the marriage through documentation and ensuring it adheres to both Indian and Canadian laws. Divorce can also affect immigration status. Permanent residents generally remain unaffected unless the marriage is proven fraudulent. Divorce might impact citizenship applications, potentially delaying or affecting the outcome. Engaging a family lawyer and immigration lawyer knowledgeable in international marriages is beneficial to avoid legal complications during divorce proceedings. Recognizing Foreign Marriages under Canadian Law Marriages conducted legally in another country are typically recognized in Canada. This means that for couples married in India, their marriage is considered valid, allowing them to seek a divorce in Canada without first divorcing in India. One spouse must have lived in a Canadian province for at least a year to apply for divorce under Canadian jurisdiction. Procedure to File for Divorce in Canada Initiating a divorce in Canada involves several steps including filing a divorce application, serving the application to the other spouse, waiting for their response, attending court hearings if necessary, and obtaining the divorce order. Proper documentation is essential, including the divorce application, a Notice of Family Claim, and potentially financial statements or affidavits. Consulting a family lawyer ensures all necessary documents are correctly prepared and submitted. Comparing Divorce Laws: Canada vs. India Key differences between divorce laws in Canada and India include types of divorce, waiting periods, and duration. Canada offers joint, uncontested, and contested divorces, while India provides mutual and contested divorces. India requires a six-month waiting period for mutual divorces, whereas Canada generally mandates a one-year separation. Contested divorces in India can take years, whereas in Canada, contested cases might be resolved more quickly, sometimes through desk order divorces. Canadian law permits divorce primarily due to marriage breakdown, evidenced by a one-year separation, adultery, or cruelty. In India, divorce grounds include adultery, cruelty, desertion, religious conversion, and mental instability. The Hindu Marriage Act and the Special Marriage Act govern these proceedings, with mutual petitions simplifying the process compared to contested cases. Conclusion Proceeding with a divorce across international boundaries requires a comprehensive understanding of applicable laws and meticulous preparation. Engaging experienced family lawyers helps both parties adhere to procedures and protect the individual rights of those involved, making the process more manageable. Whether the marriage took place in India or another country, consulting a lawyer and ensuring all documentation is in order before initiating divorce proceedings is crucial. Each situation is unique, so obtaining tailored legal advice is the best way to safeguard one’s interests during this challenging time. If you have questions about getting a divorce in Canada if you were married in India or other family law-related topics, please contact Katelyn Bell, family lawyer at Devry Smith Frank LLP at 416-446-5837 or katelyn.bell@devrylaw.ca “This article is intended to inform. Its content does not constitute legal advice and should not be relied upon by readers as such. If you require legal assistance, please see a lawyer. Each case is unique and a lawyer with good training and sound judgment can provide you with advice tailored to your specific situation and needs.” By Fauzan SiddiquiBlog, Family LawAugust 19, 2024November 13, 2024
