New U.S. Registration Requirements for Canadians, Including Snowbirds: What You Need to Know As Canadians increasingly flock to the United States (“U.S.”) for extended stays—whether for vacations, work, or retirement—new regulations have been introduced that could significantly impact snowbirds, travelers, and businesspeople alike. Specifically, the U.S. has implemented new alien registration requirements for foreign nationals, including Canadians, who plan to stay in the U.S. for more than 30 days. This move comes as part of the country’s newly issued Protecting the American People Against Invasion executive order as part of ongoing efforts to streamline border security and enhance the management of foreign nationals and long-term visitors. If you are a Canadian planning a visit to the U.S., particularly for an extended stay, here is everything you need to know about the new U.S. registration process. Why the Change? Historically, Canadians traveling to the U.S. for fewer than 180 days were not required to undergo the same visa application process as travelers from other countries. They could simply show up at the border, and with a few exceptions, be granted entry for a period of up to six months. Recent changes to U.S. immigration policy have shifted the status quo, particularly for Canadians who plan to stay for more than 30 days. This shift is part of the U.S. government’s broader initiative to improve border security, track visitors more effectively, and ensure that visitors comply with their allowed stay periods. What Does the New Registration Process Involve? Canadians and other foreign nationals who are not already registered and who wish to stay in the U.S. for more than 30 days must create a U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) online account and complete and submit the electronic Form G-325R. This form must be filed online—it cannot be filed by mail or in person. Once the above form is filed, USCIS will determine whether a biometric services appointment is required to collect fingerprints. If the registrant requires biometric collection, USCIS will schedule an appointment at a U.S. Application Support Center (“ASCs”). Biometric collection is not required for Canadian visitors and foreign nationals under 14 years of age. Once registered and all biometrics are provided (if necessary), USCIS will post a notice in the registrant’s online account where they can print a PDF version for their records. There is no filing fee for Form G-325R, nor is there a fee associated with the biometric services. Who Must Register? The following people must create an online USCIS account and register using Form G-325R: All aliens 14 years of age or older who were not registered and fingerprinted (if required) when applying for a visa to enter the United States and who remain in the United States for 30 days or longer. They must apply before the expiration of those 30 days; The parents or legal guardians of aliens less than 14 years of age: Parents or legal guardians must apply for the registration of aliens less than 14 years of age who have not been registered and remain in the United States for 30 days or longer, before the expiration of those 30 days; Any alien, whether previously registered or not, who turns 14 years old in the United States, within 30 days after their 14th birthday; Aliens present in the United States without inspection and admission or inspection and parole who have not otherwise registered (that is, aliens who crossed the border illegally); Canadian visitors who entered the United States at land ports of entry and were not issued evidence of registration; and Aliens who submitted one or more benefit requests to [the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services] not listed in 8 CFR 264.1(a), including applications for deferred action or Temporary Protected Status who were not issued evidence of registration listed in 8 CFR 264.1(b). Who Does Not Need to Register? Lawful permanent residents of the USA; Aliens paroled into the United States under INA 212(d)(5), even if the period of parole has expired; Aliens admitted to the United States as nonimmigrants who were issued Form I-94 or I-94W (paper or electronic), even if the period of admission has expired; All aliens present in the United States who were issued immigrant or nonimmigrant visas before their last date of arrival; Aliens whom [the Department of Homeland Security] has placed into removal proceedings; Aliens issued an employment authorization document; Aliens who have applied for lawful permanent residence using Forms I-485, I-687, I-691, I-698, I-700, and provided fingerprints (unless waived), even if the applications were denied; and Aliens issued Border Crossing Cards. Who Should Be Particularly Cautious? The new registration rules affect any Canadian who plans to stay in the U.S. for more than 30 days and who is not already registered in the USCIS system. The following key groups should be especially mindful of the new laws: Snowbirds: Canadians who head south to warmer climates during the winter months are a primary focus of this new regulation. If you plan to spend more than a month in places like Florida, Arizona, or California, you will need to follow the registration process. Retirees: Many Canadians retire in the U.S., often spending several months at a time. If you fall into this category and intend to stay beyond 30 days, registering beforehand is a requirement. Business Travelers: Canadians travelling for work, attending conferences, or managing business affairs in the U.S. for more than 30 days must also comply with these new rules. Family Visitors: If you are visiting family in the U.S. for an extended period, make sure you are aware of these registration requirements to avoid any disruptions to your stay. What Happens if You Do Not Register? Failure to comply with the new registration requirements could result in complications at the border, including denial of entry or being given a shorter stay period than originally planned. For snowbirds, this could mean holidays or vacations that are cut short, and it may even impact your ability to enter the U.S. in the future. Additionally, an overstay without proper registration or not abiding by the terms of your visa could lead to severe penalties. This includes imprisonment, fines and potentially being barred from reentering the U.S. for a certain amount of time. Tips for Smooth Registration and Travel Plan Ahead: Make sure to complete your registration well in advance of your planned departure date, and at minimum, within 30 days of your arrival to the U.S. Advanced planning can save you time and prevent unnecessary stress at the border. Keep Documents Handy: Be sure to have your registration notice, travel itinerary, proof of accommodation, return flight, and any other required documentation on hand when you arrive at the border. Consult a Legal Professional: If you are unsure about your specific circumstances—whether due to previous visits, or if you plan to stay for an extended period—consider consulting with an immigration lawyer or travel expert to ensure you meet all the requirements. Conclusion: A New Era for Canadian Visitors The new U.S. registration requirements for Canadians staying longer than 30 days mark a significant change in the way cross-border travel is managed. While this might seem like a hassle, the goal is to enhance security and streamline the experience for long-term visitors. By understanding the process and taking the necessary steps to register ahead of time, you can continue to enjoy your time in the U.S. without unexpected surprises or disruptions. As always, stay informed about the latest immigration policies and be proactive in meeting the requirements to ensure smooth and hassle-free travel! Bon Voyage! Looking for an Immigration Lawyer? Immigration lawyer Benjamin Grubner specializes in Canadian and U.S. immigration matters. His dual jurisdiction insight allows him to offer clients holistic solutions that consider the legal processes of both locations. Benjamin can be reached at 416-446-3328 or email benjamin.grubner@devrylaw.ca. This article was co-authored by Articling Student, Sanaz Sakhapour. This article is intended to inform. Its content does not constitute legal advice and should not be relied upon by readers as such. If you require legal assistance, please see a lawyer. Each case is unique, and a lawyer with good training and sound judgment can provide you with advice tailored to your specific situations and needs. By AlyssaBlog, ImmigrationMarch 17, 2025March 18, 2025
Court of Appeal Declines to Comment on the “Without Cause” Termination Provision in Dufault v. Ignace (Township) On December 19, 2024, the Court of Appeal released their highly anticipated decision in Dufault v. Ignace (Township).[1] The Court dismissed the appeal and confirmed that the termination provision was unenforceable; however, they declined to comment on the enforceability of the “without cause” termination provision. Facts The plaintiff employee signed a fixed-term employment contract with the defendant employer (the “Contract”). The Contract began in November 2022, and was set to end over two years later on December 31, 2024. The Contract contained the following “with cause” termination provision: “4.01 The Township may terminate this Agreement and terminate the Employee’s employment at any time and without notice or pay in lieu of notice for cause. If this Agreement and the Employee’s employment is terminated with cause, no further payments of any nature, including but not limited to, damages are payable to the Employee, except as otherwise specifically provided for herein and the Township’s obligations under this agreement shall cease at that time. For the purposes of this Agreement, “cause” shall include but is not limited to the following: (i) upon the failure of the Employee to perform the services as hereinbefore specified without written approval of Municipal Council and such failure shall be considered cause and this Agreement and the Employee’s employment terminates immediately; (ii) in the event of acts of willful negligence or disobedience by the Employee not condoned by the Township or resulting in injury or damages to the Township, such acts shall be considered cause and this Agreement and the Employee’s employment terminates immediately without further notice.” The Contract also contained the following “without cause” termination provision: “4.02 The Township may at its sole discretion and without cause, terminate this Agreement and the Employee’s employment thereunder at any time upon giving to the Employee written notice as follows: (i) the Township will continue to pay the Employee’s base salary for a period of two (2) weeks per full year of service to a maximum payment of four (4) months or the period required by the Employment Standards Act, 2000 whichever is greater. This payment in lieu of notice will be made from the date of termination, payable in bi-weekly installments on the normal payroll day or on a lump sum basis at the discretion of the Township, subject at all times to the provisions of the Employment Standards Act, 2000. (ii) with the exception of short-term and long-term disability benefits, the Township will continue the Employee’s employment benefits throughout the notice period in which the Township continues to pay the Employee’s salary. The Township will continue the Employee’s short-term and long-term disability benefits during the period required by the Employment Standards Act, 2000 and will pay all other required accrued benefits or payments required by that Act. (iii) all payments provided under this paragraph will be subject to all deductions required under the Township’s policies and by-laws. (iv) any further entitlements to salary continuation terminate immediately upon the death of the Employee. (v) such payment and benefits contributions will be calculated on the basis of the Employee’s salary and benefits at the time of their termination.” The plaintiff was terminated without cause on January 26, 2023, almost two years prior to the end of the Contract. The defendant provided the plaintiff with two weeks’ of termination pay in lieu of notice and continued her benefits for two weeks, in accordance with her minimum statutory entitlements under the Employment Standards Act, 2000, S.O. 2000, c. 41 (the “ESA”). Motion Decision The plaintiff alleged that the termination provisions in the Contract were illegal and unenforceable; as such, she was entitled to a common law notice period. The plaintiff moved for summary judgment for damages for the duration of her fixed-term contract. Justice Pierce agreed. In the motion decision, [2] she briefly reviewed the legal principles governing the enforceability of employment contracts, including: Employees have less bargaining power than employers when employment agreements are made, as employees rarely have enough information or leverage to bargain with employers on an equal footing. Employees are likely unfamiliar with the minimum standards in the ESA and may not challenge unlawful termination clauses. The ESA is remedial legislation designed to protect employees; as such, courts should favour an interpretation of the ESA which encourages employers to comply with the Act and extend its protections to employees. Termination clauses should be interpreted to encourage employers to draft ESA-compliant employment agreements. If an order to comply is the only consequence for drafting a non-compliant clause, then employers will have little incentive to comply. A termination clause will rebut the presumption of reasonable notice only if its wording is clear. If a termination clause is ambiguous, then courts should interpret it in a way that gives the greater benefit to the employee.[3] Moreover, employment contracts must be interpreted as a whole; if any part of the termination provisions contravene the ESA, then the entirety of the termination provisions are invalid and unenforceable. This is true even if the employer does not seek to rely on the illegal provision.[4] After reviewing the law, Justice Pierce determined that the termination provisions violated the ESA in several ways. A. The “For Cause” Termination Provision at Article 4.01 is Unenforceable First, Article 4.01 of the Contract stated that a “for cause” dismissal disentitles the employee to termination notice and termination pay; however, this is a common law standard that is not found within the ESA or its regulations. Instead, section 2(1)(3) of Ontario Regulation 288/01 of the ESA states that “[a]n employee who has been guilty of wilful misconduct, disobedience or wilful neglect of duty that is not trivial and has not been condoned by the employer” is not entitled to notice of termination or termination pay. Here, the employer conflated the “grounds for dismissal under the ESA with a common law standard that does not appear in the ESA.”[5] Moreover, the test for “wilful misconduct” under the ESA is higher than the test for “just cause”: “In addition to providing that the misconduct is serious, the employer must demonstrate, and this is the aspect of the standard which distinguishes it from ‘just cause’, that the conduct complained of is ‘wilful’. Careless, thoughtless, heedless, or inadvertent conduct, no matter how serious, does not meet the standard. Rather, the employer must show that the misconduct was intentional or deliberate. The employer must show that the employee purposefully engaged in conduct that he or she knew to be serious misconduct. It is, to put it colloquially, being bad on purpose.”[6] Further, Justice Pierce found that the inclusion of “failure to perform services” in the definition of “for cause” was not the same as wilful misconduct and thus enlarged the criteria for dismissal without notice. Moreover, the Contract did not mention the saving provision of the ESA which limits “wilful misconduct” to conduct that is “not trivial.”[7] It does not matter that the defendant did not rely on the impugned “for cause” termination provision; if any part of a termination provision contravenes the ESA, then the entirety of the provision is unenforceable.[8] Nevertheless, Justice Pierce went on to consider the enforceability of the “without cause” provision at Article 4.02 of the Contract. B. The “Without Cause” Termination Provision at Article 4.02 is Unenforceable Article 4.02 provided for payment of “the employee’s base salary for two weeks per year of service to a maximum of four months or the period required by the ESA, whichever is greater.” However, the section 60(1) of the ESA requires that the employee receive all “regular wages” during the notice period, which consists of more than the employee’s base salary.[9] “Regular wages” also include commissions, vacation pay, and sick days, none of which were provided for in Article 4.02.[10] In the most controversial aspect of her decision, Justice Pierce also took issue with Article 4.02 which allowed an employer to terminate an employee “at any time” in their “sole discretion.” Justice Pierce noted that this was untrue; an employer’s right to dismiss an employee is not absolute. [11] For example, employers cannot terminate an employee: Pursuant to section 53 of the ESA, at the end of a protected leave, including pregnancy leave, parental leave, family medical leave, sick leave, and bereavement leave; and Pursuant section 74 of the ESA, in reprisal for asking an employer to comply with the ESA, inquiring about their rights under the ESA, filing a complaint with the Ministry under the ESA, exercising or attempting to exercise a right under the ESA, providing information to an employment standards officer, and inquiring or disclosing their pay to their coworkers to ensure that their employer is complying with the Damages Justice Pierce determined the quantum of damages with reference to the decision from Howard v. Benson Group Inc. (The Benson Group Inc.). The Court in Benson Group held that an employee who is terminated without cause in a fixed-term employment contract without an enforceable provision for early termination without cause is entitled to receive the wages and benefits for the entire duration of the contract.[12] Accordingly, she awarded the plaintiff with $157,071.57 in damages, representing 101 weeks of base salary and benefits, less the 2 weeks of salary and benefits already paid by the defendant.[13] Appeal The defendant appealed the motion decision and argued that the termination provisions complied with the minimum standards set by the ESA. The appeal was dismissed. The Court decided the appeal solely on the basis of the “for cause” termination provision. The Court found that Article 4.01 contravened the ESA for the following reasons: The standard for wilful misconduct established in section 2(1)(3) of the Ontario Regulation 288/01 of the ESA is higher than the standard for just cause dismissal at common law. Wilful misconduct requires conduct done by employees “deliberately, knowing they are doing something wrong” and has been described as “being bad on purpose.”[14] As such, an employee terminated “for cause”, but not “wilful misconduct” remains entitled to notice of termination and termination pay; if the employer does not provide this, then they are in contravention of the ESA.[15] The “for cause” provision also provides a more expansive definition of “cause” that does not amount to wilful misconduct. For instance, “failure to perform services” does not amount to wilful misconduct.[16] The Court also declined the defendant’s request to reconsider the Court of Appeal’s decision in Waksdale v. Swegon North America Inc.: “In Waksdale, this court held that the termination provisions in an employment contract must be read as a whole. If one termination provision in an employment contract violates the ESA minimum standards, all termination provisions in the contract are invalid. This holding in Waksdale was followed in Rahman. As a three-judge panel, we are precluded from reconsidering the holding in Waksdale. Following the holding in Waksdale, because the “for cause” termination clause in the employment contract is void as contrary to the ESA minimum standards, all termination provisions in the contract are invalid. Although the termination of the respondent was without cause, whether or not the “without cause” termination provision is itself contrary to the ESA minimum standards is irrelevant. Both termination clauses are invalid and unenforceable.”[17] The Court also declined to consider Justice Pierce’s conclusions on the “without cause” provision: “Given our conclusion that the “for cause” termination clause of the employment contract is unenforceable as contrary to the ESA and that, pursuant to Waksdale, this renders all of the termination provisions unenforceable, it is not necessary to consider the appellant’s arguments that the motion judge erred in finding the “without cause” termination clause also unenforceable as contrary to the ESA, and we expressly do not rule on that submission. The appellant argued that the motion judge’s findings in relation to the “without cause” termination clause may affect other employment contracts. In our view, resolution of the issues the appellant raises regarding the “without cause” termination clause should be left to an appeal where it would directly affect the outcome.”[18] The Court affirmed Justice Pierce’s award of damages based on the plaintiff’s entitlement under the remainder of the fixed-term contract. Conclusions Unfortunately, this decision did little to address the question of the enforceability of “without cause” termination provisions which allow employers to terminate employees “at any time” in their “sole discretion.” It seems likely that this question will continue to plague employers and employment lawyers until the Court of Appeal is forced to address this issue directly. Employers should avoid using language in termination provisions stating that an employee’s employment can be terminated “at any time” and “in the their sole discretion.” What Does This Mean for Employers? Both decisions in Dufault emphasize the need for clearly and carefully-drafted termination provisions in employment contracts. Dufault also demonstrates the significant risk and liability that poorly-drafted termination clauses can cause for employers, particularly those who enter into fixed-term employment contracts. To limit their exposure, employers should make it a practice to regularly review their employment contracts with an employment lawyer to ensure that they comply with the ESA and remain enforceable in the ever-changing landscape of employment law in Ontario. Moreover, pending a final resolution of the “without cause” termination provision issue, employers should err on the side of caution and avoid including the impugned terminology in their employment contracts. What Does This Mean for Employees? This decision reflects the employee-friendly approach that courts have taken to employment contracts in Ontario. While there is no guarantee that this interpretation will prevail in the coming years, employees with a “without cause” termination provision that allows their employers to terminate them “at any time” in their “sole discretion” should be aware of the enforceability issues with their contract and the potential remedies available to them following their termination. Employees should consult with an employment lawyer to determine whether their contract is enforceable and whether any severance package offered to them is consistent with their legal entitlements. If you want to learn more about the enforceability of your employment contract as an employee or employer, please contact experienced employment lawyer, Marty Rabinovitch, of Devry Smith Frank LLP at 416-446-5826 or marty.rabinovitch@devrylaw.ca. This blog was co-authored by Articling Student, Leslie Haddock. This article is intended to inform. Its content does not constitute legal advice and should not be relied upon as readers as such. If you require legal assistance, please see a lawyer. Each case is unique and a lawyer with good training and sound judgment can provide you with advice tailored to your specific situation and needs. [1] 2024 ONCA 915 [Dufault, ONCA]. [2] Dufault v. The Corporation of the Township of Ignace, 2024 ONSC 1029 [Dufault, ONSC]. [3] Ibid at para 19, citing Wood v. Fred Deeley Imports Ltd., 2017 ONCA 158 at para 28. [4] Waksdale v. Swegon North America Inc., 2020 ONCA 391 at para 10-11 [Waksdale]; Rahman v. Cannon Design Architecture Inc., 2022 ONCA 451 at para 30 [Rahman]. [5] Ibid at paras 32-38. [6] Plester v. PolyOne Canada Inc., 2011 ONSC 6068 at para 55. [7] Dufault, ONSC, supra at para 37. [8] Waksdale, supra at paras 10-11 and Rahman, supra at para 30. [9] Ibid at para 42. [10] Ibid at paras 43-45. [11] Ibid at para 46. [12] Howard v. Benson Group Inc. (The Benson Group Inc.), 2016 ONCA 256 at para 44. [13] Dufault, ONSC, supra at paras 48-51. [14] Rahman, supra at para 28. [15] Dufault, ONCA, supra at paras 16-18. [16] Ibid at paras 19-21. [17] Ibid at paras 23-24 [citations omitted]. [18] Ibid at para 25. By AlyssaBlog, Employment LawFebruary 24, 2025March 18, 2025
The Tax Court or the Federal Court? The Supreme Court of Canada Weighs in on Jurisdictional Issues in Tax Law On June 28, 2024, the Supreme Court of Canada released its decisions in Dow Chemical Canada ULC v. Canada[1] and Iris Technologies v. Canada,[2] which addressed the question of jurisdiction in tax matters. Tax Jurisdiction in Canada Two courts in Canada have jurisdiction to hear tax matters: the Tax Court of Canada (“Tax Court”) under the Tax Court of Canada Act, R.S.C. 1985 c. T-2 and the Federal Court under the Federal Courts Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7 (“FCA”). The Tax Court has jurisdiction over various tax matters, including under the Income Tax Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.) (“ITA”) and Excise Tax Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. E-15 (“ETA”), dealing with the Goods and Services Tax (“GST”). The Tax Court has exclusive jurisdiction over the correctness of tax assessments under the ITA and ETA and has jurisdiction to hear appeals and references regarding tax matters. However, the Tax Court has limited remedial powers; it cannot provide administrative law remedies and can only remit a decision back to the Minister of National Revenue (the “Minister”) for reconsideration. The Federal Court has jurisdiction to judicially review decisions from federal boards and tribunals, including discretionary decisions made by the Minister regarding tax matters. However, the Federal Court does not have jurisdiction to hear appeals of tax assessments or other non-discretionary decisions relating to tax matters. Unlike the Tax Court, the Federal Court has broad remedial powers, may grant administrative law remedies, and can compel the Minister to take, or refrain from taking, certain actions. Dow Chemical Canada ULC v. Canada Facts In Dow Chemical, Dow Chemical Canada ULC (“Dow”) entered into a non-arm’s length loan agreement with a related Swiss company. As a result, Dow incurred expenses for its 2006 and 2007 taxation years and reported income for the 2006 taxation year in respect of the toll manufacturing services it provided to the Swiss company. Following a review of the transactions between Dow and the Swiss company, the Minister reassessed Dow for its 2006 taxation year, applying the transfer pricing rule set out in s. 247(2) of the ITA and significantly increasing Dow’s income for that year. Section 247(2) states that where a taxpayer is dealing with a non-arm’s length and non-resident person, the amounts in a given transaction will be adjusted to reflect what would have been agreed to if the person was at arm’s length. Dow requested that the Minister use her discretion under s. 247(10) of the ITA to make a downward transfer pricing adjustment. Section 247(10) provides that where an amount is identified that would decrease the taxpayer’s income, a downward adjustment cannot be made unless the Minister decides that the circumstances are appropriate. Here, the Minister refused. Dow sought judicial review of the Minister’s discretionary decision in the Federal Court and appealed the 2006 reassessment to the Tax Court. In the appeal for reassessment, the parties referred a question of law to the Tax Court: “Where the Minister of National Revenue has exercised her discretion pursuant to subsection 247(10) of the Income Tax Act (“ITA”) to deny a taxpayer’s request for a downward transfer pricing adjustment, is that a decision falling outside the exclusive original jurisdiction granted to the Tax Court of Canada under section 12 of the Tax Court of Canada Act and section 171 of the ITA?”[3] The Tax Court determined that the Minister’s discretionary decision under s. 247(10) was a necessary component of the tax assessment, and thus could be reviewed by the Tax Court under their jurisdiction to review the correctness of assessments. The Federal Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, stating that the Federal Court had exclusive jurisdiction to judicially review discretionary decisions by the Minister under s. 247(10). Decision In a 4-3 majority, the Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal. Justice Kasirer, writing for the majority, noted that a decision under s. 247(10) is distinct from a tax assessment; a “tax assessment” is “a purely non-discretionary determination by the Minister of the taxpayer’s tax liability for a particular taxation year.”[4] In contrast, a decision under s. 247(10) allows for discretion and is “based on policy considerations rather than the strict application of the law to the facts.”[5] If the Court accepted Dow’s proposed expanded definition of “assessment,” which would include discretionary decisions that it claims are directly linked to assessments, this would create significant legal uncertainty.[6] Accordingly, challenges to the Minister’s discretionary decisions must be heard by the Federal Court. Justice Kasirer then turned to the issue of remedies. Dow sought an order for reconsideration and reassessment; however, such an order cannot compel the Minister to reconsider her discretionary decision under s. 247(10) because the decision was not an assessment nor part of one. In contrast, the Federal Court has access to administrative law remedies; the Federal Court may grant a declaration to quash the Minister’s discretionary decision under s. 247(10) upon a judicial review of the decision. The Minister then will have to reconsider and possibly issue a new decision, which may affect the amount of tax owing and thus impact the correctness of the assessment, which is reviewable by the Tax Court.[7] As such, there may be an occasion where a matter will proceed under the jurisdiction of both courts. Iris Technologies v. Canada Facts Iris Technologies Inc. (“Iris Technologies”) filed GST returns claiming tax refunds under the ETA. The Minister audited the reporting periods and issued assessments disallowing some of the tax credits claimed and imposing penalties. Iris Technologies applied for judicial review of the Minister’s assessment in the Federal Court. Iris Technologies sought three declarations: The Minister failed to afford procedural fairness in the audit and failed to provide Iris Technologies with an opportunity to respond to the proposed adjustments; The assessments were made without evidentiary foundation and were contrary to findings of fact made by the Minister; and The assessments were made for the improper purpose of seeking to deprive the Federal Court of the jurisdiction in a related application.[8] The Attorney General moved to strike the application for judicial review. The prothonotary dismissed the motion, stating that the application was not bereft of any chance of success. The Federal dismissed the Attorney General’s appeal. The Federal Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and struck out the application on the grounds that it was, essentially, a collateral challenge to the correctness of an assessment, which is a matter within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tax Court. Decision The Supreme Court of Canada unanimously dismissed the appeal and granted the Attorney General’s motion to strike the application. The Court agreed that the Federal Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the first two of Iris Technologies’ claims. For the third claim, all agreed that it should be struck, but were split 4-3 on the reason for doing so. Justice Kasirer, writing for the majority, confirmed that, notwithstanding the issuance of a tax assessment, the Federal Court has exclusive jurisdiction to conduct judicial review of the Minister’s discretionary decisions, including those that directly impact tax liability.[9] The Federal Court has jurisdiction to hear applications for judicial review under section 18.1 of the FCA. Section 18.5 of the FCA provides an exception to this jurisdiction if Parliament expressly provides an appeal to another court; s. 302 of the ETA provides taxpayers an opportunity to appeal the correctness of tax assessments to the Tax Court.[10] Here, a tax assessment under the ETA is not a discretionary power; it is a non-discretionary determination where the outcome is dictated by statute.[11] The first two claims alleged by Iris Technologies regarding procedural unfairness and lack of an evidentiary foundation for the assessment were within the jurisdiction of the Tax Court. Justice Kasirer determined that “they are best characterized as attacks on the correctness of the assessment which is the proper subject matter of an appeal to the Tax Court.”[12] As the Tax Court has exclusive jurisdiction over challenges to the correctness of assessments per s. 302 of the ETA, s. 18.5 of the FCA applies and ousts the Federal Court’s jurisdiction.[13] While the third claim alleging that the Minister acted with an improper purpose could fall within the jurisdiction of the Federal Court, Justice Kasirer determined that it should be struck. Iris Technologies did not allege facts that, if assumed to be true, would give any support to the claim. Iris Technologies did not demonstrate any motive or conduct of the Minister besides to allege that the assessment was issued to deprive the Federal Court of jurisdiction in a related proceeding. Justice Kasirer rejected this argument; the mere fact that an assessment was issued does not oust the Federal Court’s jurisdiction. If the true purpose of the application is to seek practical relief against the exercise of ministerial discretion, the bar in s. 18.5 of the FCA does not apply and the Federal Court retains jurisdiction.[14] In obiter, Justice Kasirer also stated that the declaratory relief sought by Iris Technologies would have no practical effect.[15] A declaration will only be granted if it will have practical utility and settle a ‘live controversy’ between the parties.[16] Here, the declaration would not quash or vacate the assessments; as such, it would serve little to no purpose. The State of Tax Jurisdiction Post Dow Chemical and Iris Technologies These decisions demonstrate several important principles for determining jurisdiction for tax matters: Appeals of tax assessments, which are objective and non-discretionary, are properly the jurisdiction of the Tax Court. In contrast, appeals involving discretionary decisions made by the Minister, including whether to make a downward adjustment under s. 247(10) of the ITA, must proceed via a judicial review application in the Federal Court. However, if a discretionary decision involves a tax assessment, the decision in Dow Chemical indicates that it may be necessary to seek relief in both the Federal Court and Tax Court. The Tax Court does not have jurisdiction in an application for judicial review where the true purpose of the application is to seek practical relief against the exercise of ministerial discretion. In such circumstances, s. 18.5 of the FCA ousting Federal Court jurisdiction does not apply and the Federal Court retains jurisdiction over the matter. While it remains important for taxpayers to commence proceedings in the proper jurisdiction, the question of jurisdiction remains murky and unclear. This is particularly true for cases such as Dow Chemical which may require a taxpayer to seek a remedy in both the Federal Court and Tax Court. In Dow Chemical, Justice Kasirer noted that “Parliament has turned its mind to the difficulties that arise from the fractured jurisdiction of the Tax Court and the Federal Court over tax matters…In my view, it falls to Parliament to respond, if appropriate, to the[se] concerns.”[17] While we await further clarification from Parliament, the jurisdictional debate will continue to plague taxpayers and tax lawyers alike. The line of cases underscores the importance of commencing tax litigation in the correct jurisdiction. If you have a tax matter, please reach out to our Toronto tax lawyer by calling 416-449-1400 or emailing info@devrylaw.ca to schedule a consult. This article was co-authored by Articling Student, Leslie Haddock. This article is intended to inform. Its content does not constitute legal advice and should not be relied upon by readers as such. If you require legal assistance, please see a lawyer. Each case is unique and a lawyer with good training and sound judgment can provide you with advice tailored to your specific situation and needs. [1] Dow Chemical Canada ULC v Canada, 2024 SCC 23 [Dow Chemical]. [2] Iris Technologies Inc. v Canada, 2024 SCC 24 [Iris Technologies]. [3] Dow, supra at para 17. [4] Ibid at paras 41-43. [5] Ibid at para 50. [6] Ibid at paras 57 and 78. [7] Ibid at paras 104-107. [8] Iris Technologies, supra at para 16. [9] Ibid at para 7. [10] Ibid at paras 33-34. [11] Ibid at para 7. [12] Ibid at para 10. [13] Ibid at paras 37-38. [14] Ibid at paras 41-44. [15] Ibid at para 57. [16] Ibid at para 58, citing Daniels v Canada (Indian Affairs and Northern Development), 2016 SCC 12 at para 11. [17] Dow, supra at paras 114-115. By AlyssaBlog, TaxJanuary 28, 2025March 18, 2025
What Will Happen to My Debt After Death? Debt can be stressful, but what happens to your debt when you die? Many Canadians worry about whether their debt gets passed down to family members or if loved ones can inherit debt in Canada A recent Ipsos poll revealed that most Canadians are in debt of some kind, whether it be a mortgage or credit card debt, and that most of those who are in debt feel burdened and stressed out by the thought of repaying it. [1] One way to combat the anxiety of owing money is to educate yourself about the treatment of debt at various stages. In this blog, we provide the legal perspective on how Canadians’ debt gets paid off after death. Does My Debt Get Passed Down? A common concern is whether you inherit debt in Canada when a loved one passes. Fortunately, in most cases, debt is not inherited. Instead, after a Canadian dies, their estate becomes responsible for paying back the debt belonging to the deceased. When the debtor dies, the executor of the estate must repay all outstanding debts before transferring assets of the estate to its beneficiaries.[2] To reiterate, debt itself cannot be passed down. That means that any debt solely in the name of the deceased is to be paid off solely by the estate. For example, if you have credit card debt, and the credit card is solely in your name, the balance owing on the credit card is not passed down to anyone you have pre-deceased, but is instead paid off by the executor of the estate.[3] Some kinds of debt, however, can be passed down. Specifically, any debt associated with property that you have left for someone to inherit will be assigned to the beneficiary. For example, your children inherit a cottage from you, and that cottage has a mortgage. Since ownership of the cottage has been transferred to your children, so, too, will the mortgage debt. The same goes for a car, or any other property, that was financed and was not yet owned outright at the time of death. Additionally, if you carry debt jointly with another individual, like a joint credit card or mortgage, the co-debtor will assume your debt on that account after your death.[4] What If I Have Various Kinds of Debt? In general, there are three broad types of debt: secured debt, unsecured debt, and outstanding taxes owing. If you have multiple types of debt upon your death, creditors cannot freely withdraw assets or funds from your estate. Rather, creditors must abide by the following order of debt repayment after death: Federal taxes; Provincial or territorial taxes; Secured debts; and Unsecured debts.[5] Below is an example to help you understand how this operates. John Doe had the following debts when he passed away: a mortgage on his home with X Bank carrying a balance of $100,000, and a credit card balance of $5,000, also with X Bank. John Doe passed away after he filed his tax return for 2024; his Notice of Assessment revealed that he owed the CRA $10,000 in income taxes. So, John Doe died with a federal tax debt, a secured debt (i.e., the mortgage), and an unsecured debt (i.e., the credit card). This means that the executor or estate administrator must pay back the deceased’s debts in the following order: $10,000 income tax bill to CRA; $100,000 mortgage balance to X Bank; and $5,000 credit card balance to X Bank. What If My Estate Cannot Afford to Repay All My Debt? Debts must be repaid before gifts can be distributed under a will (or, if the debtor died intestate, before their next of kin receive their entitlements). This means that the property or funds a beneficiary has been gifted or is otherwise entitled to may be reduced by the amount of debt owed by the estate. This process of reductions in gifts or inheritances is known as “abatement”. If your estate has more debt than assets, like a living person, the estate may be considered insolvent. The administrator of an estate can make a proposal in bankruptcy or declare bankruptcy on behalf of the estate, and an estate can be the subject of a bankruptcy application filed against the estate.[6] Conclusion Debt management can be highly complicated, especially when putting the pieces together after the death of someone with debt. That’s why it is crucial to understand the legal status and treatment of debt and the practical effects it can have on those close to the deceased debtor. “This article is intended to inform. Its content does not constitute legal advice and should not be relied upon by readers as such. If you require legal assistance, please see a lawyer. Each case is unique, and a lawyer with good training and sound judgment can provide you with advice tailored to your specific situations and needs.” [1] Ipsos, Around Half of Canadians with Non-Mortgage Related Debt Find Paying Their Debts Stressful (n.d.), online: Ipsos https://www.ipsos.com/en-ca/around-half-of-canadians-with-non-mortgage-related-debt-find-paying-their-debts-stressful#:~:text=Perhaps%20most%20concerningly%2C%20as%20many,to%20a%20household%20budget%2C%20themselves. [2] Consolidated Credit Canada, Debt After Death: How Debt Is Handled by an Estate (n.d.), online: Consolidated Credit Canada https://www.consolidatedcreditcanada.ca/financial-news/debt-after-death-how-debt-is-handled-by-an-estate/. [3] RBC Royal Bank, Debt and Death: Managing Financial Obligations After the Death of a Loved One (n.d.), online: RBC Royal Bank https://www.rbcroyalbank.com/en-ca/my-money-matters/life-events/finances-and-relationships/death-of-a-family-member/debt-and-death-managing-financial-obligations-after-the-death-of-a-loved-one/. [4] Ibid. [5] Consolidated Credit Canada, supra, note 2; Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, RSC 1985, c B-3, s 136(1). [6] BIA, supra note 5, ss. 44, 49, 50. By AlyssaBlog, Collections and Mortgage RecoveryJanuary 22, 2025February 20, 2025
IRCC Announces New Changes for Intra-Company Transferee Work Permits On October 3, 2024, Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada (IRCC) announced a Program Delivery Update which included significant reforms to the Intra-Company Transfer (ICT) work permit category under the International Mobility Program (IMP). These updates clarified the eligibility criteria, operational requirements, and program objectives and will make it more difficult for foreign employers to move their workers to Canada. What is the ICT Program? Under the IMP, employers can obtain Canadian work permits for their foreign employees through ICTs without first applying for a Labour Market Impact Assessment (LMIA). LMIAs ensure that there is a legitimate need to hire foreign workers so as not to take away jobs from Citizens and permanent residents of Canada. Obtaining a LMIA takes additional time and effort for employers. Pathways that do not require LMIAs, such as the IMP, offer a quicker and easier option. ICT work permits under the IMP allows foreign enterprises to transfer qualifying employees to Canada on a temporary basis. Who Can Qualify for an ICT Work Permit? To qualify for an ICT work permit, applicants must meet several stringent requirements, including: Being currently employed as an executive, manager, or as an employee with specialized knowledge by an enterprise of a multinational corporation (MNC) outside of Canada; Been continuously employed at the foreign enterprise of the MNC, in a similar position, full-time for at least one year in the previous 3-year period prior to the date of application; Be transferring for a temporary period in the same capacity from the foreign enterprise of an MNC to the Canadian enterprise; Be transferring to a Canadian enterprise that: (a) has the qualifying relationship of a parent, subsidiary, branch, or affiliate of their current employer; and (b) is actively engaged in the business in respect of which the offer is made; and Comply with all other immigration requirements for temporary residence. The legislative authority for ICT work permits comes from two different regulations: R204(a) and R205(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations: Free-Trade Agreement (FTA) ICTs under R204(a) apply where Canada has an FTA with another country which includes an intra-company transfer provision, such as the Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement, the Canada-European Union Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, and the Agreement on Trade Continuity between Canada and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Eligibility depends on the nationality of the applicant and their foreign employer. General ICTs under R205(a) are available to all foreign nationals, regardless of citizenship, who meet the ICT criteria so long as their transfer to Canada would create or maintain significant social, cultural or economic benefits or opportunities for Canadian citizens or permanent residents. The IRCC’s policy update has implemented more changes to the General ICTs than the FTA ICTs. New Eligibility Requirements for Both Categories 1. Stricter Interpretation of “Specialized Knowledge” Following the policy update, a “specialized knowledge” worker must have both advanced proprietary knowledge and an advanced level of expertise. The applicant’s specialized knowledge must be unique and uncommon in the global workforce of the enterprise. Applicants now must show that they are key personnel with unique product knowledge or skills, not merely highly skilled. Position Outside of Canada Must Remain Available The applicant now must demonstrate that their position at the foreign branch remains available throughout their period of employment in Canada such that they can return to the position after their assignment, thereby affirming the temporary nature of the transfer. Movement Between ICT Categories Transitions from one ICT category to another (i.e. from a specialized knowledge worker to a manager) are restricted unless the applicant has at least one year of experience in the intended category during the three years prior to the transfer. New Eligibility Criteria for General ICTs Location of Employment and Remote Work Before this update, IRCC offered more flexibility for ICT workers performing fully remote work or working for employers that operated out of shared co-working spaces. The guidelines now state that businesses with no physical commercial premises or virtual businesses using a mailing address in commercial locations are not eligible to transfer ICTs to Canada Employers may still operate out of shared co-working spaces but applicants will be strictly scrutinized to ensure the business has a legitimate presence in Canada. Additionally, for work that can be completed remotely, then the applicant must provide a reasonable explanation as to why they must be in Canada. A time difference between Canada and the foreign employer’s location is not a sufficient reason for a transfer. Remote work is only allowed under the ICT program under certain conditions, such as meeting specific business needs. The requirement that ICT workers must work in-person at their employer’s physical commercial premises has not been included in the FTA ICT guidelines; it is not clear if the IRCC intends to apply less restrictive work location rules for applicants under FTA ICTs. Definition of a Multinational Corporation (MNC) Prior to this update, the ICT program had some flexibility when it came to start-ups and small enterprises, including corporations aiming to establish their first international branch in Canada. Now, to qualify for a General ICT, corporations must prove that they are an MNC with revenue-generating operations in at least one country besides its home country. This will make it more challenging for small start-ups to qualify for the ICT program. It is important to note that this change has not been adopted for corporations applying for FTA ICT work permits under R204(a). Skill Level of Occupation for Specialized Knowledge Workers The guidelines now state that an employee applying as a specialized knowledge worker under the General ICT category should be employed in a high-skill occupation. The guidelines define this as one which falls under TEER category 0, 1, or 2 of the National Occupation Classification (NOC) 2021 system: TEER 0 includes legislative and senior management occupations. TEER 1 includes business, finance, and administration occupations. TEER 2 includes natural and applied sciences and related occupations. Applicants whose occupations falls under a lower tier in the NOC system may still qualify as specialized knowledge workers but will be subject to greater scrutiny New Operational Requirements Wage Standards The guidelines now state that wages must be reasonable for the occupation in question. Wages for ICT workers should not be lower than the prevailing wage for the occupation in the location of work. The “prevailing wage” is the median wage published by Employment and Social Development Canada on the Job Bank site for the NOC code of the position and location of work. Although the prevailing wage has always been considered for ICT workers it appears that applicants will be subject to greater scrutiny to confirm that the wages are reasonable for the occupation, especially for workers in the specialized knowledge category. The Duration of Work Permits The duration of work permits for each ICT category remains the same: work permits for executives and managers are granted for an initial maximum 3-year period, and renewable for up to seven years total, and work permits for specialized knowledge workers are granted for an initial maximum of 3 years, and renewable for up to five years. Under the prior policy, permits for start-up companies were allowed extensions based on the progress of the Canadian operations. Now, permits for start-up workers are limited to one year. New Purpose of ICT Program Under the previous policy, ICT work permits were often used for workplace flexibility and allowed for the indirect movement of general workforce roles. Now, the IRCC has emphasized that the ICT program is to be used exclusively for temporary business needs that involve highly skilled professionals or key personnel. Transfers of general workforce roles are strictly forbidden. What Do These Changes Mean for Start-Ups? The new definition of an MNC means that an enterprise outside of Canada that only has business operations in its home country cannot become an MNC by using General ICT work permits under R205(a) to establish their first foreign enterprise in Canada. This new definition does not apply to FTA ICT applications under R204(a). Employees of foreign enterprises of MNCs may also be eligible for the ICT program under Exemption Code C61 to establish a start-up in Canada on behalf of their employer. In addition to meeting the other requirements for ICTs, applicants under C61 must: Be an executive, manager, or employee with specialized knowledge. Be entering Canada to secure physical commercial premises for the new enterprise. Until a physical premise is secured, the enterprise can use its counsel’s address. Provide reasonable human resource plans to maintain or hire staff for the new enterprise. These plans must show that the Canadian enterprise will be large enough to support an executive, management, or specialized knowledge function throughout the duration of the applicant’s work permit. Provide a realistic and comprehensive business plan and financial documentation to demonstrate that the foreign enterprise has the ability to establish and operate an enterprise in Canada. Following the policy update, the business plan must include: Clear milestones and a timeline for establishing Canadian operations; Details about how the transferred employee will achieve these goals in their role; and Evidence that the new enterprise will economically benefit Canada. C61 ICT work permits are issued for a one-year period. Extensions to C61 ICT work permits will not be approved unless there are extenuating circumstances beyond the applicant’s or their employer’s control which delayed the establishment of the new enterprise. Applicants must show that they have secured physical premises for their Canadian operations, they are continuing to work to establish the Canadian enterprise, and the foreign enterprise has the financial ability and resources to ensure the viability of the Canadian operation. If all requirements are met, an extension may be granted for an additional six months. Previously, the requirements of C61 were less stringent, business plans were minimally enforced, and companies faced less scrutiny over the viability of their Canadian operations and the necessity of the transferred employee. The new requirements highlight the need for increased accountability for foreign enterprises seeking to establish Canadian operations and comprehensive, clear, and detailed documentation. What Do These Changes Mean for Employers? The new guidelines are stricter, and applicants, particularly specialized knowledge workers, should expect greater scrutiny. More robust documentation and evidence is required for applications and extensions going forward. When submitting new applications, you must consider the new guidelines and cannot simply rely on what was accepted previously. The general ICT provision under R205(a) underwent more significant changes than the free trade agreement ICT provision under R204(a). If both routes are open to you, you should carefully consider the benefits and consequences of each option. If you only have business operations in your home country and do not qualify as an MNC, then you cannot obtain a General ICT work permit under R205(a) to establish your first international operation in Canada. If you are applying for a C61 ICT work permit, then you must provide a detailed and comprehensive business plan and be prepared to follow through and be held accountable for it. Seek professional advice if you are unsure about the application process and documentation, eligibility requirements, and the regulatory pathways available to you. These changes reinforce the ICT program’s intent to prioritize legitimate business purposes while simultaneously preventing misuse and abuse of the immigration system. This update aligns with Canada’s recent policies aimed at scaling back temporary resident programs and immigration. To learn more information and find out how these changes may apply to you, please contact experienced immigration lawyer, Benjamin Grubner, at benjamin.grubner@devrylaw.ca or 416-446-3328. This blog was co-authored by Articling Student, Leslie Haddock. “This article is intended to inform. Its content does not constitute legal advice and should not be relied upon by readers as such. If you require legal assistance, please see a lawyer. Each case is unique, and a lawyer with good training and sound judgment can provide you with advice tailored to your specific situations and needs.” By AlyssaBlog, ImmigrationJanuary 15, 2025February 20, 2025
Can I Sue Someone Over a Defamatory Social Media Post? Social media has transformed the way humans on every continent connect and gather. It allows anyone, anywhere with internet access to share their thoughts instantly. The unfortunate reality of social media is that there will inevitably be defamatory content. For those who are the subject of defamatory social media posts, there is legal recourse: a defamation action. However, before commencing a defamation action against the poster, it’s important to understand what exactly defamation is and how the courts treat it. What is Defamation? The tort of defamation has developed in the courts for centuries, and it is actually an umbrella term for two related torts: libel (the written form) and slander (the spoken form). In 2009, the Supreme Court of Canada (“SCC”) released its decision in Grant v Torstar Corp., one of the most important defamation cases in Canadian history. The SCC explained that there are three elements required for defamation to have occurred: A defamatory statement (i.e., a statement that “would tend to lower the plaintiff’s reputation in the eyes of a reasonable person”); That in fact referred to the plaintiff; and The statement was published (i.e., communicated to a third party).[1] The SCC further explained that defamation is a tort of strict liability. Unlike in the U.S., it is not necessary for the plaintiff to demonstrate intention or even carelessness on the part of the defendant. All that is required for the defendant to be held liable for defamation is that their actions amounted to the above three elements.[2] From the Newspapers to the Digital Domain On October 15, 2024, Justice Corthorn of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice (“ONSC”) released his decision on an application by the Ontario Federation of All Terrain Vehicle Clubs (the “ATV Federation”) pertaining to defamatory social media posts made by a former member of the ATV Federation.[3] In The ATV Federation v Ireland, an individual named Paul Ireland was using a burner account on Facebook to disparage the ATV Federation. Mr. Ireland was previously banned by the ATV Federation from participating in its activities because he was not complying with Ontario’s ATV safety standards, among other things.[4] Mr. Ireland, under the pseudonym “Lone Wolf ATV-er”, shared many posts with his 3,000+ followers in which he described the ATV Federation as being politically and financially corrupt, and accused it of engaging in criminal activities.[5] The ATV Federation reached out to Mr. Ireland’s burner account and asked him to remove the posts and to cease posting these things. Mr. Ireland refused, so the ATV Federation applied to the ONSC for an order than Mr. Ireland take down the posts and that he permanently cease making such posts.[6] After the ATV Federation launched the application, Mr. Ireland did not file a notice of appearance and was thus prohibited from filing materials and giving evidence without leave of the court .[7] Justice Corthorn applied the defamation test from Grant to Mr. Ireland’s posts and determined that: The Facebook posts were defamatory, because “allegations of ethical misconduct, criminality, and corruption, would tend to lower the reputation of the Federation in the eyes of a reasonable person”; The Facebook posts refer to the ATV Federation; and By sharing these posts with thousands of followers, Mr. Ireland did indeed communicate these defamatory statements about the ATV Federation to a third party.[8] Further, Justice Corthorn considered whether Mr. Ireland had raised, despite his lack of evidence, a valid defence.[9] Ultimately, His Honour found that Mr. Ireland had not raised a valid defence.[10] In light of the above, the ATV Federation won on its application and Mr. Ireland was therefore required to remove all his defamatory posts and refrain from posting more defamatory content directed at the ATV Federation. Limitation Period Under the Libel and Slander Act The Libel and Slander Act (the “LSA”) governs defamation actions in Ontario. The LSA provides for a very short limitation period in libel actions which arise out of defamatory statements published in a newspaper or broadcast.[11] The LSA defines newspaper as “a paper containing public news, intelligence, or occurrences, or remarks or observations thereon, or containing only, or principally, advertisements, printed for distribution to the public and published periodically, or in parts or numbers, at least twelve times a year.”[12] Ontario courts recognize the republishing of newspapers online as falling under this definition.[13] The LSA defines broadcasting as “the dissemination of writing, signs, signals, pictures and sounds of all kinds, intended to be received by the public either directly or through the medium of relay stations, by means of, (a) any form of wireless radioelectric communication utilizing Hertzian waves, including radiotelegraph and radiotelephone, or (b) cables, wires, fibre-optic linkages or laser beams”.[14] Section 5(1) of the LSA provides that, where the libel was published in a newspaper or broadcast, the plaintiff must, within six weeks of discovering the libel, serve the defendant with a notice of action. Further, s. 6 provides that a libel action must be commenced within three months of the plaintiff’s discovery of the defamatory content. This is a very tight turnaround for plaintiffs; normally, the limitation period in a civil action is two years.[15] Unfortunately, the Ontario courts have not yet answered the question of whether social media posts fall under the LSA’s definition of broadcast. This is because, so far, almost all cases that have come before the courts have come by way of a motion. Every time one of these motions comes before the court, the motion judge explains that a trial is necessary to make a determination on this issue due to the extensive evidence required by the trial process.[16] Until a court rules on this issue at trial, the applicable limitation period to a defamation action arising from a social media post is up for debate. Conclusion The Grant test for defamation, while originally developed in the context of a newspaper article, has been applied by Ontario courts to find that social media posts can constitute defamation. Despite the lack of clarity from the courts on whether the LSA limitation period applies to social media posts, the law is clear that those who are the subject of defamatory content on social media have legal recourse in civil court. This blog is intended to inform. It is in no way intended to provide legal advice. If you believe you have been defamed on social media, or you have been accused of defaming someone on social media, be sure to seek legal advice from a lawyer. This blog was co-authored by articling student Rachel Weitz. [1] Grant v Torstar Corp., 2009 SCC 61 at para 28 [Grant]. [2] Ibid. [3] See: Ontario Federation of All Terrain Vehicle Clubs v Ireland, 2024 ONSC 5723 [Ireland]. [4] Ibid at para 4. [5] Ibid at para 24. [6] Ibid at paras 6-7. [7] Ibid at para 6; Rules of Civil Procedure, RRO 1990, Reg 194, r. 38.07(2). [8] Ireland, supra note 3 at paras 32-4. [9] Ibid at paras 36-43. [10] Ibid at para 44. [11] Libel and Slander Act, RSO 1990, c L12, s 2 [LSA]. [12] Ibid, s 1(1). [13] See: John v Ballingall et al, 2016 ONSC 2245; See also: Shtaif v Toronto Life Publishing Co. Ltd, 2013 ONCA 405. [14] LSA, supra note 3, s 1(1) [15] Limitations Act, 2002, SO 2002, c 24, Sched B, s 4 – Basic Limitation Period. [16] Devante v Beckerman et al, 2024 ONSC 3425 at paras 23-4; Nanda v McEwan, 2019 ONSC 125 at para 77; By AlyssaBlog, LitigationDecember 2, 2024December 4, 2024
I Bought a Home and I am Beginning to Notice Defects – Am I Liable For the Cost of Repairs? Buying a home is the biggest purchase you will ever make. This applies not just in terms of the price but also in ensuring the property meets your expectations. When purchasing property, buyers want their new space to feel comfortable and safe. However, defects can sometimes remain hidden, appearing months after moving in. These are known as latent defects, and they are common in real estate transactions. Understanding how these defects impact liability is key for both purchasers and vendors. Defining Latent Defects The universally-accepted definition of latent defects is that they are defects “which an ordinary purchaser would not be expected to unearth in a routine inspection”.[i] In Costa v Wimalasekera, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice (“ONSC”) explained that the due diligence expected of a “prudent solicitor” is not what the courts expect of the ordinary purchaser.[ii] The ordinary purchaser is just that – an average person, without any additional qualifications or special knowledge, looking to buy real property. The notion of the ordinary purchaser is inextricably linked to what constitutes a routine inspection. What would that ordinary purchaser do upon inspection of a home? Activities like opening up the drywall or digging around in the yard are certainly not included. Generally, a routine inspection is an examination of what is “readily observable”.[iii] Any defect that is readily observable upon a routine inspection is known as a patent defect. Liability for Repairing Defects The law is clear that vendors are liable for latent defects of a property. Liability of vendors for latent defects is a well-established notion in Ontario law, dating back to no later than 1979 in the case of McGrath v. MacLean. More recently, the ONSC explained in Vieira v. Dawson that damages for latent defects will arise if the purchaser can establish one of the following: That the vendor was aware of and concealed the defect so as to prevent discovery by the purchaser; or Although he did not deliberately conceal the damage so as to prevent discovery by the purchaser, the defect was known to the vendor and was such that it rendered the property uninhabitable or dangerous or potentially dangerous.[iv] The first scenario is self-evident: if a vendor intends to mask the problem or otherwise prevent its discovery, then they would be liable. The second scenario is somewhat trickier. Number two does not necessitate that the vendor knew something about the property was defective, but it does say that they ought to have known that some part of the property could potentially cause danger. For example: section 8(1) of the Building Code Act requires individuals to obtain a permit in order to construct, demolish, or modify a building. Permits under the Building Code Act ensure compliance with minimum safety standards. So, if a vendor has done such work without a permit and does not inform the purchaser of this fact, the second scenario from Vieira v. Dawson has been satisfied because they have created a potentially dangerous situation. If the purchaser can satisfy the court that the vendor behaved according to one of the above scenarios, then the vendor will be liable to pay damages. In cases of latent defects, the damages are “the cost of repair or replacement of the defect in such a way that the [purchaser] receives what [they] contracted for”.[v] Put another way, if a purchaser bargained for a property to be in good working order, then that purchaser should not be liable for paying out of pocket when they find out the property is not what they bargained for. Importantly, if a vendor was in fact unaware of the defects such that they do not meet either of the above criteria, then they will not be liable to pay for repairs. Conclusion Buying a home really is the most significant transaction the average person will make in their lifetime. That is why it is crucial for vendors to do their part by repairing defects before they become a problem for purchasers, and also by informing purchasers of the property’s history of defects. On the other hand, purchasers should exercise caution when examining a home and should make sure to pose plenty of questions about a property to avoid future disputes. This article was co-authored by articling student Rachel Weitz. This article is intended to inform. Its content does not constitute legal advice and should not be relied upon by readers as such. If you require legal assistance, please see a lawyer. Each case is unique, and a lawyer with good training and sound judgment can provide you with advice tailored to your specific situations [i] Costa v Wimalasekera, 2012 ONSC 6056 (CanLII) at para 21, quoting Real Estate Law (3 ed) by Barry J Reiter et al, p 281. [ii] Ibid at para 22. [iii] Gallagher v Pettinger, 2003 CanLII 21844 (ON SC) at paras 38-40. [iv] Vieira v Dawson, 2018 ONSC 413 (CanLII) at para 19. [v] Ibid at para 32. By AlyssaBlog, Real EstateOctober 28, 2024February 25, 2025
Paw-sitive Changes? A Closer Look at BC’s Pet Ownership Laws In May 2023, DSF published a blog discussing the approach taken by Ontario courts regarding pet ownership disputes and the then-proposed amendments to British Columbia’s Family Law Act. Specifically, the BC government sought to clarify what kinds of decisions its courts can make regarding pets and the processes in arriving at those decisions. A New Approach to Pet Custody As of January 15, 2024, these amendments are now law in BC. Section 97 now includes subsections (4.1) and (4.2), as follows: (4.1) In determining whether to make an order under subsection (1) respecting a companion animal, the Supreme Court must consider the following factors: the circumstances in which the companion animal was acquired; the extent to which each spouse cared for the companion animal; any history of family violence; the risk of family violence; a spouse’s cruelty, or threat of cruelty, toward an animal; the relationship that a child has with the companion animal; the willingness and ability of each spouse to care for the basic needs of the companion animal; any other circumstances the court considers relevant. (4.2) An order respecting a companion animal must not declare that the spouses jointly own the companion animal, or require the spouses to share possession of the companion animal. The factors listed under s. 97(4.1) are based on the factors that courts across the country use to determine what is in the best interests of a child when making an order pertaining to parenting time and decision-making responsibility (i.e., child custody). This approach is very different from Ontario’s “contemporary approach” to determining pet ownership. Despite being called “contemporary”, Ontario’s approach – developed in Coates v Dickson – characterizes pets as property, rather than as a family member over which an individual can have custody. Applying the Amendments: Bayat v Mavedati On March 13, 2024, the Supreme Court of BC (their equivalent of Ontario’s Superior Court) delivered the province’s first judgment pursuant to the new s. 97(4.1). In Bayat v Mavedati, Ms. Bayat sought exclusive care of a golden retriever named Stella following her separation from Mr. Mavedati after three years of cohabitation.[1] The couple had brought Stella home in August 2020.[2] Justice Nielsen found that the parties had evenly split the cost of purchasing Stella, and had also shared the responsibility for her care over the years that they lived together with her.[3] However, many of the facts were in dispute. Ms. Bayat alleged on several occasions that Mr. Mavedati was negligent and even abusive as an owner. Ms. Bayat went so far as to allege that Mr. Mavedati hit Stella after she had an accident in the home.[4] Justice Nielsen disagreed with Ms. Bayat’s evidence, though, in large part due to the fact that Mr. Mavedati is a veterinarian and displayed his love and good intentions toward his dog during his testimony.[5] Ultimately, Justice Nielsen ordered that the parties were to equally share custody of Stella on an interim basis, following a “week-on/week-off” schedule.[6] Further, the parties were to have an equal say in the decision-making process as it relates to Stella’s care.[7] An Illegal Order? While the prospect of joint pet custody is encouraging, recall what subsection 97(4.2) says about this kind of arrangement: (4.2) An order respecting a companion animal must not declare that the spouses jointly own the companion animal, or require the spouses to share possession of the companion animal. Based on the statute’s wording, it appears that Justice Nielsen made an order contrary to subsection 97(4.2). Notably, Justice Nielsen did not reference this subsection in the decision, focusing instead on the factors in subsection 97(4.1). Consequently, joint custody of Stella may not be permissible under the new law. Clarification is needed on whether the Court can indeed grant shared possession of a companion animal and whether this authority is limited to interim orders. What Comes Next? Despite the controversial shared custody order, the decision in Bayat v Mavedati offers hope for the future of Canadian caselaw surrounding pet ownership. As Justice Nielsen remarked: “The recent amendments to the [BC Family Law Act] put the ownership of a companion animal…in the context of something that goes beyond ownership of [goods].”[8] These amendments recognize that companion animals are not objects; rather, they are sentient beings capable of experiencing love. This article was co-authored by articling student Rachel Weitz. “This article is intended to inform. Its content does not constitute legal advice and should not be relied upon by readers as such. If you require legal assistance, please see a lawyer. Each case is unique, and a lawyer with good training and sound judgment can provide you with advice tailored to your specific situations and needs.” [1] Bayat v Mavedati, 2024 BCSC 619 at paras 1-2 [Bayat]. [2] Ibid at para 4. [3] Ibid at paras 4, 7, 15. [4] Ibid at para 12. [5] Ibid at paras 8-12. [6] Ibid at para 15. [7] Ibid at para 18. [8] Ibid at para 14. By AlyssaBlog, Family LawOctober 14, 2024February 20, 2025
Can the Bank Increase the Interest Rate On My Mortgage After I Default? Defaulting on a mortgage is an extremely stressful event for any property owner. Many consequences can arise in the event of a default. Fortunately for the defaulting party, an interest rate hike on the money owing is not one of them. Keep reading to learn about the prohibition against mortgagees from charging punitive fees after a mortgagor has defaulted. Terminology Before reading on, here’s an explanation of the terms used frequently in this blog: Arrears – the state of having a debt that is overdue. Mortgagor – the party that has obtained a mortgage. Mortgagee – the party that has granted the mortgage. Default – non-compliance with the terms of the mortgage agreement; normally, this occurs when the mortgagor fails to pay out the balance of the mortgage at maturity (i.e., when the mortgagor is in arrears). Section 8 of the Interest Act The Interest Act is a piece of federal legislation that governs the levying of interest on loans. According to s. 2 of the Interest Act, “any person may stipulate for, allow and exact, on any contract or agreement whatever, any rate of interest or discount that is agreed on.”[1] Note that corporations have the status of legal personhood, so s. 2 applies equally to all individuals and corporations, including banks. Section 8 sets out the prohibition against punitive fees, and provides that: No fine, etc., allowed on payments in arrears 8 (1) No fine, penalty or rate of interest shall be stipulated for, taken, reserved or exacted on any arrears of principal or interest secured by mortgage on real property or hypothec on immovables that has the effect of increasing the charge on the arrears beyond the rate of interest payable on principal money not in arrears. Interest on arrears (2) Nothing in this section has the effect of prohibiting a contract for the payment of interest on arrears of interest or principal at any rate not greater than the rate payable on principal money not in arrears. In simpler terms, s. 8(1) prevents the mortgagee from raising the interest rate on money that is in arrears. Subsection 8(2) explains that interest can be charged on money in arrears, but it must be at most the same rate that was charged on the principal amount of the mortgage. Let’s look at a case to illustrate how s. 8 operates. Krayzel Corporation v Equitable Trust Co., 2016 SCC 18 Facts A corporation called Lougheed Block Inc. (“Lougheed”) owned an office building in Calgary with multiple mortgages on it, including the one held by the appellant, Krayzel Corporation. In 2006, Lougheed obtained a mortgage from Equitable Trust Co., which is now known as Equitable Bank (“Equitable”). The terms of the mortgage were as follows: Maturity date: June 30, 2008; Amount of loan: $27 million; Interest rate: prime plus 2.875 per annum.[2] At the time of the mortgage transaction, the prime rate was 6% and at maturity, it was 4.75%, so the rate fluctuated between 8.875% and 7.625% over the course of the mortgage.[3] The maturity date arrived, and Lougheed defaulted on the mortgage. Equitable did something very commonly employed by mortgagees: it extended the mortgage for a short period of time under what they called a Renewal Agreement.[4] The Renewal Agreement was effective as of August 1, 2008, for a period of 7 months and carried an interest rate of prime plus 3.125 for the first 6 months, and then 25% for the 7th month. Again, the agreement matured and Lougheed couldn’t pay. So, the parties entered into a second Renewal Agreement. The terms of the second agreement were quite complex, so the Supreme Court of Canada (“SCC”) broke them down as follows: The 2nd agreement was effective as of February 1, 2009 – meaning it was retroactive to before the 1st agreement matured; The yearly interest rate would be 25%; Lougheed was to make monthly interest payments at a “pay rate” of either 7.5% or prime plus 5.25%, whichever was greater; Interest would accrue to the mortgage at a rate of the difference between the amount payable at 25% and the amount payable by Lougheed at the rate in #3; and “[Were] Lougheed to make all payments in full and on time and to pay out the loan when due, it would be excused from paying the amount representing the difference between interest payable at 25 percent and interest actually paid in accordance with the lower rate.”[5] Unfortunately, they defaulted on the first payment, so Equitable demanded repayment at 25% interest.[6] Issues Was s. 8 of the Interest Act violated by the imposition of an interest rate effective only where the mortgagor defaulted?[7] Judgment: YES Is s. 8 violated where the mortgagee raises interest rates solely because of “the mere passage of time”?[8] Judgment: NO Reasoning The Purpose and Scope of Section 8 The Supreme Court of Canada (“SCC”) first looked into the true purpose of s. 8 of the Interest Act. Brown J., writing for the majority, agreed that the holding of the BC Court of Appeal in Reliant Capital Ltd. v Silverdale Development Corp. that this clause exists “to protect the owners of real estate from interest or other charges that would make it impossible for owners to redeem, or to protect their equity.”[9] Brown J. then turned to the wording of s. 8 and noted that it is directed at “the effect of the [particular] mortgage term” and not merely the explicit term itself. Section 8 is concerned with the consequences flowing from the operation of the term. Brown J. therefore concluded that if the term’s effect “is to impose a higher rate on arrears than on money not in arrears, then s. 8 is offended”.[10] Even if the term is presented by the mortgagee as a discount, if the discount is effectively punitive to the mortgagor, then that term violates s. 8 of the Interest Act.[11] The First Renewal Agreement Recall that the first renewal agreement implemented the higher rate of 25% only after 6 months had passed, and was to occur regardless of Lougheed’s level of compliance therewith. Brown J. held that this increase was “triggered by the mere passage of time” rather than purely because Lougheed defaulted. In light of this, there was no violation of s. 8 under the terms of the first renewal agreement.[12] The Second Renewal Agreement The second renewal agreement was where the rate increase lost its legitimacy. Recall that under term #5, if Lougheed made good on all its mortgage payments, it would pay the lower rate, or what Equitable labelled as the “pay rate”. However, once Lougheed defaulted, Equitable drastically increased the interest rate and demanded repayment carrying a 25% interest rate. Brown J. held that the second renewal agreement had the effect of placing a higher charge on arrears than what Equitable was charging on the principal money owed.[13] The “pay rate” was actually a discounted rate, and once Lougheed was in arrears, the rate rose to 25%, the real rate. Brown J. thus concluded that to label “one charge as an ‘interest rate’ and the other as a ‘pay rate’ is of no consequence,” because the effect was to punish Lougheed for defaulting.[14] Conclusion There are myriad reasons – legal and financial – to make your mortgage payments in full and on time. However, mortgagees cannot fiddle with the interest rates as a way to incentivise or punish you for paying or defaulting. Whether you’re a lender or a borrower, it’s essential to have legal advice to assist you with drafting, negotiating, interpreting, and enforcing (or contesting!) your mortgage loan terms. Contact a DSF lawyer today for assistance. This blog was co-authored by articling student Rachel Weitz. Disclaimer: This blog is for educational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. If you are in need of assistance, please contact a lawyer. Each case is unique, and a lawyer with the proper training and sound judgment can provide you with advice tailored to your specific situation and needs. [1] Interest Act, RSC 1985, c I-15, s 2 [Interest Act]. [2] Krayzel Corporation v Equitable Trust Co., 2016 SCC 18 at para 4 [Equitable]. [3] Bank of Canada, “Interest rates posted for selected products by the major chartered banks,” 2005-2010, retrieved on September 20, 2024, <https://www.bankofcanada.ca/rates/banking-and-financial-statistics/posted-interest-rates-offered-by-chartered-banks/>. [4] Equitable, supra note 2 at para 5. [5] Ibid at para 6. [6] Ibid at para 7. [7] Ibid at para 1. [8] Ibid at para 2. [9] Ibid at para 21. [10] Ibid at para 25. [11] Ibid at para 31. [12] Ibid at para 33. [13] Ibid at para 35. [14] Ibid. By AlyssaBlog, Collections and Mortgage RecoveryOctober 7, 2024February 20, 2025
What’s In a Name? The Evolution of a “Child” Under the Succession Law Reform Act Proper estate planning requires effectively communicating the intentions of the deceased. In doing so, even simple words can create significant interpretation issues in the administration of an estate and lead to long and costly court battles. One very common issue faced in Estates Law is the definition of a “child” in a will or under the Succession Law Reform Act (SLRA).[1] While general definitions are outlined in most will templates to provide guidance for executors and solicitors, a definition as simple as “child” or “issue” has caused significant confusion over the years. Children Conceived and Born After Parent’s Death The SLRA was amended in 2017 to expand the definition of a child to include a child that was conceived and born after a parent’s death: 1(1) In this Act, “child” includes, (a) a child conceived before and born alive after the parent’s death, and (b) a child conceived and born alive after the parent’s death, if the conditions in subsection 1.1 (1) are met; Section 1.1(1) outlines the conditions that must be met for a child conceived and born alive after a person’s death to be considered a “child” under the Act: 1.1 (1) The following conditions respecting a child conceived and born alive after a person’s death apply for the purposes of this Act: The person who, at the time of the death of the deceased person, was his or her spouse, must give written notice to the Estate Registrar for Ontario that the person may use reproductive material or an embryo to attempt to conceive, through assisted reproduction and with or without a surrogate, a child in relation to which the deceased person intended to be a parent. The notice under paragraph 1 must be in the form provided by the Ministry of the Attorney General and given no later than six months after the deceased person’s death. The posthumously-conceived child must be born no later than the third anniversary of the deceased person’s death, or such later time as may be specified by the Superior Court of Justice under subsection (3). A court has made a declaration under section 12 of the Children’s Law Reform Act establishing the deceased person’s parentage of the posthumously-conceived child. In essence: The child’s parent must have been the married spouse of the deceased, as the SLRA does not recognize common law spouses; The spouse must give notice of their intention to use the reproductive material of the deceased to the Estate Registrar for Ontario no later than six months after the deceased’s death; The child must be born within three years of the deceased’s death, unless the court orders otherwise; and The spouse must obtain a declaration from the court under Section 12 of the Children’s Law Reform Act (CLRA) that the deceased is a parent of the child. Special Relationship In Ksianzyna Estate v. Pastuszok [2], Justice Brown was tasked with analyzing whether the court should expand the definition of “child” in subsection 1(1) of the SLRA to minors who enjoy a “special relationship” with a testator. While Part V of the SLRA, which governs dependant support claims, expands the definition of “child” to include those who the deceased “has demonstrated a settled intention to treat as a child of his or her family,”[3] this broader definition does not apply to the rest of the Act. Justice Brown declined to expand the general definition of “child” under the SLRA, as “the power to expand the scope of familial terms or social concepts beyond their plain and ordinary meaning is one that rests with the legislatures, not with the courts.”[4] As such, someone who enjoyed a “special relationship” with a testator or deceased will not be considered a “child” under the SLRA for testate or intestate succession but may be considered a child for the purposes of dependant support. Foster Children The Ontario Superior Court of Justice recently re-examined the definition of a child under the SLRA in Estate of Sydney Monteith v Monteith et al.[5] In this case, the applicant was a foster child seeking to receive a share of her foster father’s estate under the rules of intestate succession after he died without a will. However, the court affirmed the decision in Ksianzyna and found that: …the harsh, but inescapable, reality is that she does not qualify because she is a foster child who has never been adopted. This is a matter of statute, the plain language of which I find to be very clear, and which is binding and determinative. I am not disposed to ignore the statutory provisions discussed above in the guise of “doing justice”.[6] Accordingly, like children who enjoy a “special relationship” with the testator, a foster child is not considered a “child” for the purposes of testate or intestate succession under the SLRA but may be able to make a dependant support claim if they fall within the expanded definition of “child” under Part V of the Act. “Settled Intention” of the Deceased As noted above, while the definition of a child is strictly interpreted under subsection 1(1) of the SLRA, there is a broader definition of “child” under Part V of the Act which addresses the support of dependants. An application for support under Part V of the Act is distinct from a claim of inheritance under a Will or on intestacy. Under subsection 57(1) a “child” includes “a person whom the deceased has demonstrated a settled intention to treat as a child of his or her family.” In that same section, a “dependant” is defined as the spouse, parent, child, or sibling of the deceased “to whom the deceased was providing support or was under a legal obligation to provide support immediately before his or her death.”[7] As such, if the deceased was providing support to a person who was not their biological or adopted child, but to whom they had demonstrated an intention to treat as their child, then that person could make a dependant support claim against their estate. The term “settled intention” has been the topic of much debate in the courts. In Pigott Estate v Pigott, the court held that at least one of the following factors must be present to establish a settled intention between the deceased and the applicant: Cohabitation with the child; Treatment of the child on equal footing with their own child(ren); Decision-making power with respect to the child’s name, schooling, discipline, and so on; Continued access or visitation with the child; or Financial contributions to the daily needs of the child. [8] While one of these factors must be present for the courts to find that the deceased had a “settled intention” to treat a person as their child, the existence of one of these factors will not be determinative in showing that a settled intention exists. For instance, in Stajduhar v Wolfe, Justice Dunphy concluded that the deceased had no settled intention to treat his girlfriend’s daughter as his child, even though he provided her with financial support while at university.[9] In reaching this conclusion, Justice Dunphy also considered that the deceased never introduced the applicant to any of his family, including his two children; never characterized applicant as his daughter to his friends or family; did not provide for the applicant in his will, even though he specifically provided for his own two children; and that none of the deceased’s writings indicated that he intended to treat the applicant as his child.[10] Impact on Estate Planning Under the general definitions section of the SLRA, a “child” is limited to biological or adopted children of the deceased. Foster children, stepchildren, and others who the deceased intended to treat as their child do not fall within this definition; as such, they have limited recourse in the courts, unless they are applying for dependant support. If you are planning your estate, it is important to be aware of these definitions and consider their implications. If your child is not your adopted or biological child but you still want them to benefit from your estate, then you must plan your estate accordingly, given that they will have no rights on if you pass away without a Will. Moreover, it is important to ensure that the definition of “child” in your Will is broad enough to include anyone that you consider to be your child, or that you specifically refer to your child by name in your bequests. If you would like more information regarding estate planning, please contact experienced Wills and Estates Lawyer, Jillian Bowman, of Devry Smith Frank LLP at (249) 888-4639 or at jillian.bowman@devrylaw.ca This article is intended to inform. Its content does not constitute legal advice and should not be relied upon by readers as such. If you require legal assistance, please see a lawyer. Each case is unique and a lawyer with good training and sound judgment can provide you with advice tailored to your specific situation and needs. This blog was co-authored by Summer Law Student, Jason Corry, and Articling Student, Leslie Haddock. [1] RSO c S 26 [SLRA]. [2] 2008 CanLII 59321 (ON SC) [Ksianzyna]. [3] SLRA, supra note 1, s 57(1). [4] Ksianzyna, supra note 3 at para 12. [5] 2023 ONSC 7246 [Monteith]. [6] Ibid at para 24. [7] SLRA, supra note 1, s 57(1). [8] Pigott Estate v Pigott, 1998 CarswellOnt 2875 at para 14. [9] Stajduhar v Wolfe, 2017 ONSC 4954 at para 154, aff’d Kerzner Estate, 2018 ONCA 258, refused leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada [Stajduhar]. [10] Ibid at para 153. By AlyssaBlog, Family LawSeptember 23, 2024February 20, 2025
